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
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Don't Lieve

ADOLFO CALDERÓN COUSIÑO

92

SHORT DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
OF THE
CHILEAN-PERUVIAN RELATIONS
1819-1879

"FACTA NON VERBA"

1st ENGLISH EDITION

Santiago de Chile
IMPRENTA UNIVERSITARIA
ESTADO 63
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The Question Between Chile and Peru

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THE CHILEAN-PERUVIAN FRIENDSHIP AND ITS DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

«*Facta non verba*».

We must confess, although it is painful to do so, that the policy of approachment and cordial friendship with Peru, which has constituted always an aspiration, as noble as fraternal, of our leaders and of the Chilean Nation, has always finished in regrettable failure.

We do not refer only to present times, after the Ancon Treaty, but to all the life of Peru as an independent people.

It is to be thought that Peruvian ill-will for all that is Chilean is the natural sequence of the animosity and rancour aroused by the war of the Pacific, but this is a complete mistake. As we will see in this brief historical digest, which is a mere

exposition of official undeniable documents, **Peru since she was born to free life with the help of Chile, has been a latent enemy of this country and the peruvian antagonism and ingratitude have been exhibited in all forms at every moment with or without cause;** it could almost be said that this antagonism as all the characteristics of racial hatred.

It is difficult to believe that any country has received from a neighbour so many services as those received by Peru from our country up to 1879, and we will see the form in which these services were retributed.

A rapid perusal of history, inexhaustible source of valuable lessons, will give the most honourable proofs of the generosity, sincerity and cordial pan-american spirit that have guided the international policy of Chile since she started independent life.

It is a question of facts and not words, and so public conception can be had of what the friendship of Peru means to Chile.

THE LIBERATING EXPEDITION

We are in 1819. Chile barely liberated from the Spanish power turned towards Peru bleeding in the effort for conquering liberty.

As it is easy to understand, the internal situation of Chile was very difficult: she needed organization of public services and to affirm and strengthen new born institutions.

Nevertheless, all was left aside before the difficult situation of our brothers of the Rimac and on the 5th February of that year, Bernardo O'Higgins, Supreme Director of the Nation, by means of his Minister of State José de Irisarri agreed with Argentine the treaty Irisarri-Tagle whose first clause says: «Both Contracting Parties being in accord with the wishes manifested by the inhabitants of Peru and espe-

cially those of Lima, that help should be given with armed forces to throw out the Spanish Government and establish that which will be most similar to her physical and moral constitution, both Contracting Parties take the pledge of covering the expense of an expedition, already prepared in Chile with this object in view. Both Contracting Parties mutually guarantee to each other the independence of the State to be formed in Peru, once her capital is liberated».

This was the first step taken to help the constitution of the Peruvian Republic and this was the origin of the «Liberating Expedition».

PERU ASKS FROM CHILE FURTHER HELP IN MEN AND FUNDS (1823)

The struggle lasted four years and of the Liberating Expedition there existed only glorious remnants. In these critical circumstances Peru looked again towards Chile to find there, once again, generous help given in a spontaneous and fair manner.

Under date of February 15th, 1823 the Government of Chile received the following communication from the Government of Peru:

«To the Supreme Government of Chile: The unfortunate day of Moquegua has destroyed the strongest army with which counted the Republic to conquer her independence. Small remnants of the forces of Chile and Los Andes have succeeded in disengaging themselves and are preparing to cooperate with the army of this State,

that is under preparation at present. The enemy, proud of the advantage obtained, has begun concentrating its troops to rapidly advance on this capital to gather the result of his last victory.

«This Government has left undone none of the measures advised by the urgency of the situation, so as to repair a disaster that endangers the liberty of Peru, and to oppose by sea and land enough strength to resist the Spaniards; but this Government fears that all efforts and sacrifices of the free territory of Peru, may be insufficient to avoid an unlucky setback, **if we have not the support of the heroic people, to which this republic owes such prominent services.**

«The greatest difficulty this Government meets for the furtherance of its aims is the lack of money, needful for all enterprises. As the powerful cerro de Pasco has been continuously in the hands of the enemies and its mines are destroyed, the main source of wealth of Peru is stopped; with the internal trade paralyzed by the war and all external commerce in foreign hands the constant export of money is unavoidable

and without it, the impulses of authority will be too weak to work the wheels of the State machinery.

«In this situation the Government of Peru has been informed that the loan obtained in England by the agents of the Chilean Government, has produced a great amount that is at your disposal; and although the obligations contracted by this Republic constitute a pending debt of Peru to the Chilean State and not forgetting the serious attentions that surround you, the Peruvian Government oversteps its own sentiments and confiding that only the interest of the success of the cause of America will inspire you in front of the crisis menacing the country, proposes to receive as loan the amount of one million pesos, under the conditions fixed by the english commerce or under those that may be suggested and can be accepted, as it is never expected that they can be inspired in any other sentiment than that of saving Peru from the common enemy and consolidate the brotherly union existing between both States.

«If the expressed help is accorded, it is of foremost importance that remittance be

made, under account and risk of this State, and that some person in this capital be authorized to agree on the convention as to **the manner and term of payment, to which the government of Peru will be so more faithful**, as this opportune help will essentially contribute to the liberty of Peru» (1).

Together with the former the Government of Peru sent another communication of which we take the following:

«...For this reason, the Government of Peru would like to be indebted to the generous State of Chile, for a last effort of fraternal interest, **by sending to the help of this Republic all the regular forces she can spare.**»

Peru had obtained already men, supplies, rifles and funds; and asks yet *for all the regular troops.*

(1) The agreement for the payment of these funds was signed only 25 years later.

THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE GRANTS ALL THE PETITIONS OF PERU (1823)

(« The unexampled and heroical conduct of Chile, will make more and more close the union and friendship of both Republics».—LARREA, Minister of Peru in Chile).

(« With such powerful help i do not doubt that within the present year war will be finished in this territory, the Peruvians having the sweet satisfaction of confessing that their Chilean brothers have never ceased making the most noble and generous efforts for the fixing and out-carrying the project of their emancipation». Paragraph of a note of the Foreign Minister of Peru, Francisco Valdivieso).

The Chilean Government granted the clamorous petitions of Peru in the terms of the Egaña-Larrea treaty, whose text says:

«The Government of the Peruvian Republic as a consequence of the defeat expe-

rienced by the allied army in Moquegua has asked help from the Government of Chile to maintain her independence and continue the war against Spain. *The Government of Chile wishes to cooperate to the great cause of american independence and to give proof of the high regard it has for the welfare of that State, her ally, by augmenting the efforts already made to give freedom to Peru.*

«Both Governments have agreed to stipulate the terms and conditions for this help and have approved the following:

«Art. 1st: *The State of Chile promises to help Peru with forces between 2,500 and 3,000 men, which will be placed equipped and armed in the port of Valparaíso to be transported to the coast of Peru to cooperate with the army there existing.*

«Art. 2d: Besides the above mentioned help, the Chilean State promises that it will continue maintaining in Peru the Chilean division forming part of the Liberating Army and which is in that territory.

.....
«Art. 4th: *The Government of Chile considering the great need of money felt by the*

Government of Peru, as stated by its special Envoy, helps that Republic with the fifth of the original amount of the loan obtained by Chile in London.

.

In this regard we must point out that the urgency of money of the Peruvian Government was so great, *that even before the signature of the pact*, the president of Peru José de la Riva Agüero had drawn already for 75,000 pesos, 5 reales and 1 cuartillo.

For the payment of this loan, that the Government of Peru promised to cover as soon as it received the money of a loan obtained in London about that time for Peru, TWENTY FIVE YEARS LATER a protocol was signed (1848).—Benavente-Ferreyros protocol—that says:

«There being pending accounts between Chile and Peru, and convinced both Governments of the necessity of settling and **compromising** these at once, putting to all reclamations deriving from them a satisfactory and honourable end for the Republics, as indicated by the good relations

that happily unite them and the close and cordial friendship they have always manifested, they have adjusted the following:

«Art. 1st: After considering all liabilities of Peru towards Chile, proceeding from the part of the English loan ceded and transferred in 1823 and from the campaigns of the Independence and the Restoration, as well as from any other source previous to this Convention; and after equally considering the objections and discharges presented by Peru it has been *stipulated as a term of compromise* that Peru recognizes in favour of Chile as full and only debt up to date, the amount of 4 million pesos.

.....

«Art. 4th.: *In the year 1853* all arrangements will be made between both Governments to proceed to the gradual amortization of the four millions of capital in which operation Peru will have the same advantages as Chile has right to.»

Follow some other concessions that would seem unbelievable if they were not recorded in so respectable a public document.

The negotiations that preceded the friendly settlement and the pact itself that put an end to the Peruvian debt, serve as record of the courteous generosity of Chilean policy.

PERU ASKS THE CHILEAN ALLIANCE TO DECLARE WAR ON COLOMBIA (1828)

We have seen the good will of Chile for acceding to all Peruvian requests. Her necessities found prompt help and quick satisfaction on the part of our Government.

Let us see what was at that time the correspondence paid by Peru.

In 1827, the Government of Chile desired to normalize and establish on bases of reciprocal advantage the commercial relations between both countries and invited the Government of Peru to agree on a treaty of friendship and commerce, sending for this object as Minister Plenipotentiary in Lima Sr. Pedro Trujillos. The negotiations were barely started when they were put an end to by the obstinate refusal of the Peruvian government to suppress or

reduce the custom tax on Chilean wheat, against a similar concession on Peruvian goods. In the mind of the Government of Peru «any reduction in the import duties meant a present to Chile».

Soon after, by the persistence of Chile, negotiations were reopened but Peru who during the previous negotiations had asked the Chilean alliance to declare war on Colombia—request flatly refused by Chile—insisted in the demand of alliance and sent on the 16th. January, 1828, the following note to the Chilean representative:

«The undersigned, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, has the honour of addressing himself to the Plenipotentiary Minister of the Republic of Chile, with the object of demanding a declaration as to his **being empowered by his Government to enter in an alliance offensive and defensive against all enemies of Peru** or if only against the common enemy, meaning Spain»

He added that he wanted «a rapid decision **so as to regulate his conduct in the treaties that were being negotiated.**»

The Minister of Chile, with integrity and sincerity, answered as follows: «After the

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru examined the powers that the undersigned had the honour of presenting, **the extraordinary query**, contained in the note of 16th. January, **is incomprehensible**».

The Peruvian pretension of tying Chile to a war against a sister republic who had never injured us, being rejected, the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce so zealously negotiated by the Chilean representative in Lima failed once more (1).

Very soon after Chile had a new occasion to render services to Peru.

(1) Peru declared war on Colombia and after some initial successes her army commanded by President La Mar was completely defeated in the Portete of Tarqui by the Marshal of Ayacucho, don Antonio José de Sucre.

CHILEAN MEDIATION AVOIDS A WAR BETWEEN PERU AND BOLIVIA (1831)

The pretensions of preponderance of the Presidents of Peru and Bolivia, Gamarra and Santa Cruz, was on the point of causing a war. Great military preparations were made by both peoples to enter the struggle.

«Are the Chiefs of the Republics of Peru and Bolivia mad? «—wrote don Diego Portales to our Minister in Lima don Miguel Zañartu—«Is it possible that in these circumstances none can cede in whole or part of their pretensions? I am greatly disquieted by this conduct that is so greatly against the conciliation of the general interests of both Republics and even of the whole america, whose revolts and conflicts distance us every time more from the considerations that with a wise conduct we would receive from the European Governments».

In these circumstances Bolivia by means of her special envoy Sr. Damaso Uriburu, asked the friendly mediations of the Government of Chile which immediately sent instructions to Zañartu to this effect.

Here is a part of these instructions: «..That is why, on wishing that the mediation of Chile will not be repelled, **I do not wish either that the mediation may be harmful to the interests of Peru**».

The friendly mediation of Chile, managed with clever discretion by our Minister in Lima, resulted in the treaty of 8th. November 1831, securing the peace between both countries.

In one of its clauses it is provided that divergencies on its fulfillment would be submitted to Chilean decision and on her refusal to the United States».

The president of Peru Sr. Gamarra, wrote under the same date to Sr. Zañartu, the fortunate Minister, the following letter:

«Dear and good friend: By the communications I have just received from Sr. Latorre (Peruvian Plenipotentiary) I have learned with pleasure that treaties of Peace and Commerce have been signed. By the

same I know that you have shown yourself a true friend, a gentleman, a patriot and a just man, interested in the welfare of the peoples.

«I congratulate you for the glory of having succeeded in reconciling two American nations, worthy of better fate».

On the inauguration of the sessions of the Peruvian Congress, Gamarra said, referring to the peace treaty: **«The nation must be grateful to the Chilean Republic for the good will with which her government lent himself to remove the causes of divergence that made these treaties so necessary».**

PERU STARTS A POLICY OF FRANK COMMERCIAL HOSTILITY.

Minister Zañartu believed that the occasion was opportune to return on the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, that should attend to the commercial interests of Chile and Peru.

The intransigent resistance of Peru to allow a prudent reduction on the custom tax imposed on Chilean wheat—three dollars per bag—caused for the third time the failure of the treaty.

Zañartu resigned himself to inform the Government that he «considered impossible a treaty of commerce of mutual equity».

Meanwhile the national funds lent as disinterestedly as opportunely to the Peruvian Government were still quietly in its hands.

With the failure of the negotiations the

Peruvian Government started a policy of open hostility to Chilean trade, hostility that had no other foundation than the jealousy of Peru at the preponderance assumed by Valparaiso as trading market in the Pacific.

To this effect prohibitive measures were enacted, that represented the ruin of the importation of Chilean wheat to Peru.

Zañartu in view of the extreme seriousness for the Chilean trade of the unexplainable policy of the Peruvian Government, decided to send a note that finished as follows:

«In consequence of what I have stated, please notify me of the last resolution taken by your Government in this respect, because my Government feels impulsed, after so many useless prudential and friendly steps, to use a strict and vigorous reciprocity with Peruvian goods, as well in terms as in duties. *I must advance that the Peruvian sugar producers have made during the last years a trade so advantageous of their products as the one of the Chileans as been ruinous, a thing hat does not surprise if attention is paid*

to the equity of the duties paid in Chile by such products and the long terms—6 months—granted to the payment of even such moderate duties.»

As an answer to this communication, Zañartu obtained only generalities on friendship and good intentions.

The Government of Chile once undeceived, and considering undignified to continue making requests under such conditions for the celebration of a commercial treaty, put an end to the mission of Zañartu.

TARIFF WAR. (1832)

The natural consequence of this policy of commercial hostility **started by Peru** was a war of tariffs.

This legitimate defense has the advantage of putting clear in practice who needs more of the other, and so facilitates the road and makes easy the celebration of commercial agreements of **mutual convenience**.

Chile could take all her wheat to Brasil and bring in return all the sugar she needed. From this started the idea of a commercial treaty with Brasil who became the most loyal and constant friend of Chile.

The defensive measures of Chile were not delayed and on August 2d. 1832 the Government of Chile presented to Congress a message saying:

«The commerce existing until now bet-

ween Chile and the Republic of Peru, which by the natural circumstances of both could have been a source abundant in reciprocal benefits, **has been useful only to Peru**, giving to her a constant and sure market for her most valuable productions, while due to the instability of the fiscal provisions of that Government, the transactions of our grain trade have suffered incalculable losses.»

The project of the Executive was carried by unanimity and the sugar and molasses of Peru, that until then paid only 50 cents per 25 pounds in the Chilean customs, were taxed with three pesos.

As soon as the first information of this measure arrived in Lima, the Government of Peru hurriedly called Zañartu to state the possibility of a friendly agreement.

Soon after—account must be taken of the slow communications of that time—complete information of the new law received in Lima caused general panic among the sugar producers who saw the enormous damage they were going to experiment.

The Peruvian Government was besieged by powerful and contradictory demands:

some asked energetical reprisals—the military elements and political leaders—while others asked for common sense and prudence—the affected producers.

Between these two powerful currents and not daring to take a definite decision, the President of the Republic general Gamarra, resigned the Supreme Mandate on September 27th. in the hands of the President of the Senate, don Manuel Tellería.

Soon after the Peruvian Congress approved a law in these terms:

«Art. 1. After 40 days of the publication of this law, *the bag of wheat or flour from Chile will pay six dollars.*

Art. 2. The Executive is authorized to alter this tariff and enter in negotiations with that Republic».

Soon bread went up in Peru; the wheat from the United States with which they counted to replace that of Chile, needed a long voyage round Cape Horn in sailing ships, with great freight rates, suffering the damage of a long travel through hot climates and bearing besides all the unavoidable difficulties of a new market whose permanency was not assured to the Ameri-

can producers, by reason of the habitual instability of Peruvian policy.

It was not strange then that the wheat sold in Chilean ports at 1.50 pesos the bag, was sold in Peruvian ports at 8 and 9 dollars without competition. The American exporters understood — with their usual practical sense — that the divergency between these two brother peoples would not last and abstained from making an essay without basis or guarantee.

Nevertheless Peru preferred to carry measures to an extreme and in reprisals against all Chilean trade, issued the Commerce Regulation imposing a tax of 8% over the import duties on all merchandise not coming directly from the country of origin, measure whose only object was to hinder the use of the free warehousing facilities offered by Valparaiso.

CHILE AND PERU NEAR A RUPTURE (1834)

When things arrived to this extremity, it was feared that an armed conflict might occur between both countries.

But Peru was not, notwithstanding her arrogant and provocative attitude, in situation of entering an armed conflict, being at that time in full revolution and very poor in resources; and Chile did not think of profiting of these circumstances to give to America and the world the regrettable spectacle of a war between two brother peoples, barely born to independent life, while the manifestations of intimate fraternity repeatedly made by Chile in favour of the Peruvian people were fresh as yet.

The Government of Chile preferred to wait the re-establishment of order and that

prudence would make Peru to return on her decisions.

These hopes were not vain. With the end of the revolution, the new Government immediately sent a diplomatic representative to Chile and signed a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, providing equitable regulations for the political and commercial relations of both peoples. This was the origin of the Rengifo-Tábara treaty.

THE TREATY IS ABROGATED BY PERU SIX MONTHS AFTER AP- PROBATION (1835)

Chile, persisting in her policy of approachal and sincere friendship towards Peru, signed the treaty Rengifo-Tábara, by whose first clause the Republics of Chile and Peru ratified in the most solemn manner the firm unalterable and sincere friendship uniting them and pledged themselves to maintain perpetual peace.

Childish pledge! Mayhap it would not be wise to enquire, who obtained from such friendship the greatest benefit, until the time we are recapitulating. It does not enter in our aim to make capital of such petty things.

When the news of the signature of the treaty arrived in Lima, the people gave demonstrations of the highest enthusiasm;

the Government ordered that the national flag be hoisted in all houses and all towns of the country to be illumined during three nights.

Over the crests of the Peruvian Andes the head of the ambitious Bolivian marshal Santa Cruz could already be seen, and soon he was going to proclaim himself Supreme Protector of Peru starting the conquest of the country.

The Rengifo-Tábara treaty, published on the 28th. July 1835 and celebrated with so much joy in Lima, was abrogated by the Government of Peru the 14th January 1836, that is to say six months after promulgation.

These historical details give a truer sight than any others, of the character of the Peruvian people in his relations with other nations.

The Peruvian Minister in Chile, Sr. de la Riva Agüero, sent a note to our Government including copy of the abrogating decree and saying that he had orders *to communicate the news to Chile*.

There were no excuses or reasons: the news were merely given out.

But fate seemed to create new occasions for the Chilean nation to manifest with facts how sincere her friendship was towards Peru.

INVASION OF PERU BY MARSHAL SANTA CRUZ. CHILE GOES TO THE HELP OF PERU (1837-1839)

From some time back marshal don Andrés de Santa Cruz, President of Bolivia, was preparing vast projects of preponderance and territorial conquest.

To foster his plans he founded in La Paz a masonic society, whose first record says: «Founded by the most dear B.: Andrés de Santa Cruz, established to the W.: of Titicaca, in a sacred site where reigns silence and humbleness, 'at the eleventh day of the second masonic month, year of the true Light 5829 and of the vulgar era 1829 . The B.: Arístides (Santa Cruz) declared *that there was no reason to fear the small Peruvian army and that by good or bad reasons the annexion to Bolivia of the south*

of Peru would be obtained . (After that the north would also be annexed).

Very soon the rumours of the invasion of Peruvian territory by marshal Santa Cruz reached Chile, with news of the bloody campaign recorded by history. Those that did not fall like braves in the battle field were executed for the crime of defending their country.

It is enough to reproduce the words of the proud and valiant general Salaverry, President of Peru, whose execution was ordered by Santa Cruz: «I protest before history, before my contrymen, America and all posterity of the black murder committed against me. Having delivered myself to general Miller he presented me as prisoner to *Santa Cruz, who wishes to cement his conquest on Peruvian corpses. Peruvians, Americans, men of all the world, look at the barbarous conduct of a conqueror with a Peruvian who has no crime; who has no other ambition than the welfare and glory of his country, for which he has battled until the moment of his death. Look how horrible are the first acts of the man who*

has sworn to master Peru, destroying her best sons».

The concision of these articles does not allow further details. It is enough to tell that the Government of Chile decided to go to the help of Peru, sending an expedition under command of general Manuel Bulnes—expedition that wrote one of the most beautiful pages of the military history of Chile—and that in the battle of Yungay the Chilean arms covering themselves with glory, put an end to the domination of Santa Cruz.

The marshal fled and six years later, in December 1845 a pact was signed between the Chilean Charge d’Affairs Sr. Manuel Camilo Vial and the Peruvian general Castilla, deciding the fate of Santa Cruz. This pact was submitted to the approval of the Government of Peru which rejected it, with surprise to Chile who had only accepted what Castilla proposed in the name of Peru.

The Chilean Foreign Minister Sr. Manuel Montt—who very soon after became President of Chile—addressed a note to the Peruvian representative in Santiago, asking

for explanations, obtaining as result that especial representatives were sent to Chile by Bolivia and Peru who signed the pact Montt-Laso-Aguirre.

By this pact Santa Cruz was banished to Europe for six years and forbidden from landing in South America without especial permission of the three governments.

So ended happily and honourably the great task assumed by Chile of returning freedom to Peru, securing her territorial integrity and complete independence, giving besides to half the South American continent the tranquillity so long perturbed by the irrepressible ambition of marshal Santa Cruz.

How much did this cost to the Chilean nation and how was she repaid? It is easy to guess. . .

We will give some details gathered from historical documents, that with their authority will contribute to the formation of an exact, impartial and serene opinion on what our commercial and political relations with the Peruvian nation have been and what is to be expected from them by logical deduction in the future.

From the start of the expedition sent by Chile to help Peru—called the «Restoration Expedition»—charges were made against the Government of Chile, as ignoble as audacious, lacking as much in sincerity as in truth.

Purposes of extension and the absurdest pretensions were attributed to Chile, accusing her of **having hidden purposes of territorial conquest simulated under a pretexted protection of peruvian interests.**

With the victory of Yungay it was thought that the moment had arrived for Chile to unmask her conquering purposes, so long contemplated and covered with extreme reserve.

The expression of the thought of Chile, after the battle of Yungay was stated by her Minister of Foreign Affairs in the following official manner:

«The Government of Chile has the same peaceful sentiments it has always maintained, as they formed and form a necessary element of its policy. Its most ardent wishes are for agreement and peace, and it will maintain them with the Governments.

of Peru and Bolivia, without in the least augmenting its pretensions by reason of the splendid triumph of Yungay. It will demand today the same it proposed before: the independence of each american state and their absolute liberty to regulate in the manner they may consider fitting the institutions that must govern them».

On his side the Chilean Minister in Peru, Sr. Ventura Lavalle, made foresighted observations to the Government of Chile, which were very soon confirmed:

«I am foreseeing, he said, that we will meet insuperable difficulties even for the payment of the troops. . . We must be prepared to receive proofs of the most refined ingratitude, because the singular history of this country authorizes us to fear an irregular and untoward attitude from the peruvians. *Let us hope that we will not see these pessimistic predictions realized and that Chile will receive at least the gratitude due to the noble and generous sentiments guiding the purpose of our Government in the task of giving independence to Peru».*

To judge the sincerity and lofty spirit dominating the rulers of Chile, we will quote a paragraph of the instructions of our Government to Minister Lavalle:

«... It will not be difficult for you to *make understand to the Peruvians you meet, the enormous injustice of the pre-ventions against Chile; the fairness and generosity of our aims and the desperate conditions of the Peruvian independence if the contingencies of war forced us to compromise with Santa Cruz. Only the lack of cooperation of the Peruvian people will force Chile to accept the Peru-Bolivian Confederation; but once this case occurred we would cultivate the friendship of the Protectorate Government, with the sincerity and good faith that have been unalterable guide in our conduct with other nations.* You do not ignore that it would be easy for us to obtain honourable conditions of peace from general Santa Cruz, the day we wished to recognize him as chief of the Confederation; that masters of the sea we have nothing to fear from his arms and that no matter how this war ends, our resistance has cost him already

so dear that he would not dare to provoke it anew. Peru then would lose far more than us if this expedition fails.«

The Government of Chile had then not only to destroy the prejudices and suspicions of the Peruvian people who feared its help and did not believe in the generosity of its purposes, but had also to preach the necessity of the Peruvian people helping in her own emancipation.

With order and tranquillity restored in Peru, the Government of Chile as a further proof of cordiality, suppressed the duties paid by Peruvian sugars and molasses that were then of three dollars the 25 pounds.

It was natural to expect reciprocity from the Peruvian Government for Chilean wheat that was paying an import duty of three dollars per bag. But as usual the only thing obtained were beautiful phrases with rosy promises and **words** of gratitude.

The president of Peru, general Gamarra addressed the following to our Minister in Lima Sr. Lavalle:

«The Minister has presented to me and I have seen with the greaest complacency, the decree suppressing the duties on Peru-

vian sugars and molasses in Chile. *This act of justice and reciprocal advantage, has been received by me as a new guarantee of the cordial friendship that continues being the basis of our relations. These sentiments, that will be never retracted, can be kept in mind by you when we treat on the reduction of the duties taxing the wheat. I regret that, I cannot give at present a definite decision, because as the matter needs some consideration, I have no time to give to it,» etc.*

It is true that the Peruvian Congress approved a vote of thanks to the Republic of Chile, for her participation in the campaign of restoration.

Sr. Lavalle had plenty of reason when he made his profetic observations on Peruvian gratitude!

PERU REQUESTS THE ALLIANCE OF CHILE AGAINST BOLIVIA (1840)

Diplomatic relations between Peru and Bolivia were again strained and under danger of a rupture.

The Government of Chile received from the President of Peru, general Gamarra propositions of an offensive and defensive alliance, as can be seen by the official communication from the Foreign Office of Lima, saying.

« . . . With reference to this H. E. thinks that it is as convenient to Chile as to Peru to sign a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance to make closer the reciprocal and benevolent relations that happily subsist between both countries and so enable to oppose a mass of resistance capable of frustrating the develop-

ment of projects prepared against the independence of each. *To this effect H. E. will send to Chile, as soon as he comes back to the capital, a Minister sufficiently empowered to initiate this negotiation and meanwhile considers* **necessary to ask from the government of Chile that it obtain at a moderate price, for the account of Peru, all rifles, carbines and sabres at present in Valparaiso or coming in, no matter how many there are...**»

We will not comment of this curious petition of the Peruvian Government, converting the Government of Chile in an agent for the purchase *at moderate price*, of weapons; nor on the guarantee of payment by a Government that had as yet pending the negotiations for the payment of loans made twenty years back.

Our Government refused to make the purchase because it believed that these arms were for a war against Bolivia. As to the requested alliance, the Government of Chile answered:

«The thought of uniting both Republics is worthy of H. E. the President of Peru,

whose ideas are equal, in this regard, with those of the Government of Chile, etc....

«... *On these bases my Government has adjusted with that of Bolivia a treaty that is going to be submitted to the approval of Congress and is not only ready to adjust a similar one with Peru, but also wishes that the Peruvian and Bolivian Republics be united with equal reciprocal stipulations, forming in this way a triple pact of Alliance and guarantee that may be extended later to other Republics, with the convenient modifications, probably conducive to the establishment of the public right of the states of South America.*»

But in the Foreign Department of Lima the ideas of peace, cordiality and americanism were not predominant but rather of a different character.

It is to be thought that all leaders of Peru were under the dominion of an irrepressible bellicose nervousness, because soon after the Minister of Chile in Peru, Sr. Lavalle informed the Government of his fears of an imminent war between Peru and Bolivia.

CHILE INTERPOSES HER GOOD OFFICES TO AVOID A WAR BETWEEN PERU AND BOLIVIA (1840)

The Government of Chile again sent instructions to its Minister in Lima and this, following them, wrote to the Peruvian Government, saying:

«The rumours of a break between Peru and Bolivia have reached Chile and have caused in this country great and painful *apprehensions*. *My Government feels deeply the prospects of a war between two peoples whose welfare is so dear* and has ordered me to present to the Peruvian Government some reflections with the object of dispelling the fatal situation that seems to endanger the happiness and good name of Peru and Bolivia. *The Government of Chile orders me to present to the Peruvian Government the sentiment occasioned in Chile by the fears*

that peace may be altered in these Republics, the fervorous wishes made to see peace established permanently and the disposition it has to lend all the good offices that may be possible to obtain this high purpose».

The Foreign Minister of Peru, in name of his Government answered that **«nothing could be more agreeable than to reestablish and affirm friendly relations with Bolivia, convinced that war is the worst of ills and that the advantages of victory do not compensate the damages produced by war.»**

Gamarra himself wrote to Lavalle coinciding in the same ideas of his Minister and assuring him that *«a treaty with Bolivia is ready to be signed, putting an end to pending questions.»*

At the same time that he wrote to Lavalle, he was writing to the peruvian general La Fuente, saying:

«It is indispensable to make war to Bolivia; you are the man to direct it and there is your marshalship.»

The Government of Chile understood that it should not accept without reserves the official protests of peaceful sentiments

that the Peruvian Government alleged, (1) and convinced by the communications of Lavalle that war was impending, insisted anew, with more reasons, in the friendly mediation:

«The prospect of a near conflict between brother peoples» — said the communication of our Government—«is going to be once more a cause of pain and discredit for the American continent. In these circumstances, the President orders me to renew his request and to offer again in the most formal manner his mediation to avoid by all possible means, a regrettable rupture...

«Justice, Friendship, the welfare of America, the glory of the Restoring Army, are the only motives of this offer and will give aim to all the future steps of my Government».

This persistent insistence of the Chilean Government at the risk of appearing obstinate, evited the armed rupture.

(1) In view of the lack of seriousness from Gamarra, who at the same time manifested such contradictory aims; assuring Lavalle that peace was a fact and advising general La Fuente to prepare war on Bolivia.

PERU APPARENTLY SETTLES QUESTIONS WITH BOLIVIA (1840)

The Peruvian Government that mayhap founded in the war favourable expectations, while effussively thanking Chile for her friendly mediation, took advantage of the peace stipulations with Bolivia to deal a blow at the Chilean Government.

In the clause 10 of the peace treaty, obtained thanks to the Chilean mediation it was stipulated that the part of the expenses of the Restoration war, that **Bolivia was pledged to pay to Chile, would be directly paid to Peru** who would settle with Chile!

Note must be taken that this was done while the steps of the Government of Chile to obtain from Peru the payment of the old debt could not obtain even a satisfactory answer.

When the Chilean Foreign Department received the first news of this mockery, of the ignoble scoffing of Chilean interests and of the pledges contracted by two nations to which we had lent so many and valuable services, it immediately demanded the corresponding explanations.

The Bolivian Charge d'Affairs, Sr. Tomas Frías, answered the communication of our Government in arrogant and irritated terms contrasting with the friendly and conciliatory tone of former communications.

The Peruvian Government on its side did not answer the communication of the Chilean Minister, being busy suffocating revolutions in the north and south of the country.

Our Minister had nobody to treat with in Lima, as the President, general Gamarra and almost all the Ministers were for the most time out of the capital persecuting the rebels.

If the Government of Peru thought that the mine introduced in the clause 10 of the treaty was going to cause a war, that would make Chile lose the nobly obtained pres-

tige of a peace-loving, progressive nation, they suffered complete error.

The Government of Chile, apostle of peace and cordiality between sister nations, could not give to America the deplorable spectacle of a fratricidal war, when so many sacrifices and efforts were spent in avoiding war between them. With the experience of the Peruvian character—obtained during the troubled relations of 25 years of constant and generous services—Chile preferred to wait the development of the recent friendship of Peru with her neighbours of the Andean ranges, relishing meanwhile this new manifestation of Peruvian gratitude.

PERU INVADES BOLIVIA WITHOUT DECLARING WAR AND IS ROUTED AT INGAVI (1841)

The great project of Gamarra, his incurable obsession since coming into power, was the war with Bolivia whose army he regarded with contempt and hoped to beat easily.

He took advantage without hesitation, of the opportunity given by the revolution started in August 1841 in Bolivia.

So as not give time to Chile—this indefatigable champion of peace, this impertinent shadow always before any conflict to open the road to honourable solutions—to exert friendly mediations that would frustrate his ambitious plans, general Gamarra invaded without declaring war the territory of Bolivia.

To have an idea of the rapidity and se-

crecy of the action and of the respect manifested for International Law, it is enough to know that when the Government acting in Lima in absence of Gamarra declared war not on Bolivia, but on the party ruling Bolivia, the war was already finished in the battlefield of Ingaví..

When the Bolivian Government recieved the first news on the invasion of its territory by Peruvian troops, immediately sent a plenipotentiary to Gamarra to ask reasons for this war, of which no official advise had been given, and to ask or propose bases of agreement.

This envoy in a note to Gamarra said: «The Government of Bolivia sees with pain and surprise that the Peruvian troops invade this Republic as if she was enemy of Peru, as if she was still under the yoke of the tyrant both abhor. .»

But the Peruvian Government, that abrogated its treaties five months after proclamation, without giving reasons or excuses, answered the note of Bolivia in these terms:

The Peruvian army is in Bolivia and it would not be honourable to retire without obtaining for its country the

securities it has come to get. . . The undersigned can assure that if they are offered in such form that they will consolidate for the future the restoration of both peoples, their internal tranquillity and that pacts are celebrated in a permanent form, independent of any political disorder, nothing could be more pleasing than to see the friendship between Peru and Bolivia reestablished. . . »

The mere reading of these Peruvian demands shows their spirit.

All the efforts of the emissaries sent before him were useless: Gamarra wished to fight, defeat and return to his country with the palms of victory, after imposing on the vanquished the hard law of the victor.

Gamarra advanced quickly on La Paz. The President of Bolivia, general Ballivian, powerless to resist the advance of the Peruvian army, retired to Oruro, calling to arms all citizens between 15 and 50 years.

In these circumstances, so difficult for Bolivia and wounding for the national pride, the commander of the rebel forces, general Velasco in a movement of noble

patriotism, put all his men under the orders of general Ballivián.

With this opportune reinforcement and some emigrated argentineans—among which was lieutenant Bartolomé Mitre (1)—that were the last remnants of the unitary army routed in Famalla and escaping from the tyrant Rosas, the Bolivian army, although far inferior in numbers having only 3,700 men against 5,200 Peruvians, took a most energetic offensive.

Gamarra evacuated La Paz so as not to have his line of communications cut behind him, leaving in the town some sick soldiers that were massacred by the populace. Sr. Montaner Bello in an interesting study of this time, says: «*This abominable crime was the bloody reprisal of acts of cruelty of the Peruvians, who among other outrages, took as prisoners several ladies of La Paz and later on put in the first line of battle peaceful and powerless people taken by force among the population.*»

(1) Illustrious Argentinean statesman, that later on became President of Argentine.

Very soon the two armies met. The plain of Ingaví, near the hamlet of Viacha was the ground chosen by Gamarra to present battle.

The fight was obstinate; Gamarra who personally commanded the movements of his infantry was killed at the beginning of the battle and the efforts of the other Peruvian chiefs were useless to contain the dispersion of the soldiers, fleeing before the impetuous onrush of the Bolivain infantry and leaving all their arms and baggage in the field.

The disaster was complete for the Peruvian army. Ballivian advanced on Tacna and occupied this town and the port of Arica without meeting resistance.

The Government of Peru called Lavalle to ask him *to obtain the mediation of the Government of Chile* (1).

(1) These facts are recorded in a communication of the Foreign Minister of Bolivia. Sr. Manuel María Urcullu, to the Government of Chile.

PERUVIANS DISCOVER THAT CHILEAN FLOUR CAUSES DISENTERY

The Peruvian nation could at last enjoy peace. Although the international horizon had certain dark clouds to the north, the good offices of Chile contributed to maintain cordiality of relations between Peru Ecuador and Colombia.

But the internal situation was deplorable. Continual revolutions, external wars, public service disorganization and in a word, all the calamities attending a permanent state of war, had ruined the country.

Fortunately for Peru, at that time was discovered in her territory an abundant source of wealth: the guano.

Our diplomatic relations continued their course of alternate cordiality and coldness, irritating and annoying incidents for our

national pride not lacking, always provoked by the Peruvian government and always solved thanks to the high and serene spirit of the Chilean government.

The people of Peru and her rulers looked to Chile from some time back with definite antipathy. There was a marked prevention in Peru against all that was Chilean, and not only against the Government or persons, but the ill-will went also against Chilean goods.

The Consul of Chile in Arica Sr. Ignacio Rey y Riesco, reporting this ill-will to the Government of Chile, said:

«It seems that the bakers of Tacna and all the people are in union to find defects in Chilean flours; they allege it has bad taste or smell, and their foolishness has reached to denounce it to the police saying that the bread made with this flour causes dysentery».

And yet the Chilean flours competed *without comparison* with the Bolivian and other flours, by their quality, even under the higher price caused by the big tax they had to pay.

Meanwhile Peruvian products had in

Chile great consumption and an excellent market.

On the total of imports that was about 8 and a half million dollars at the time, about one million corresponded to Peruvian products, Peru taking the second place among the nations trading with Chile.

And these commercial interests that are to-day the main object of the aims of Governments, only received the olympic contempt of the Government and people of Peru.

INCREASE OF OUTRAGES AND VEXATIONS TO CHILEANS IN PERU (1841)

What was the cause of this ill-will, this antipathy, this rancour against Chile? Chile had had no war with them, nor with any neighbour; had helped them on every occasion that they had asked her services; had made great sacrifices to preserve their independence and their territorial integrity; no other nation could have made, in exclusive benefit of another, what Chile had done for the Peruvian nation.

Imagination fluctuates and wanders, searching for an origin, a motive, any cause for this unprecedented hate, manifested with strange uniformity by the rulers, the people, the whole society of Peru.

Were they proud of the discovery of guano and with this sprang anew with more

strengthen the emulation and rivalry for the development of commerce that had converted Valparaiso in the metropolis of the Pacific?

Were they offended, indignant of having received so many favors of the generosity and friendly deference of the Government and people of Chile?

We cannot believe it. We imagine that a nobler cause, hidden from our sight and investigations, has been the origin of such attitude, and we feel repelled to continue an investigation that gives such disagreeable results.

We will remark that, as a manifestation of this unfounded animosity, Chileans were outraged without any consideration, were forced to serve in the army and, when their services were no longer necessary, were often dismissed without payment.

The most active representations of the Chilean Minister were useless. In a note to the Peruvian Government, Lavalle said:

“Notwithstanding the reiterated promises made the wrong continues with increasing scandal, not being enough to repress

it neither my reclamations, the offers of the Government or the continual steps I privately take near the Ministers, the Prefect and the commanders of the regiments where are sent the Chileans enforced to serve. . . »

The active and reiterated steps of Lavalley succeeded in hindering this situation for some time. Unfortunately for the indefatigable Minister and for his countrymen, this truce lasted very little, and soon the outrages and persecution of Chileans and their interests increased, finishing by exasperating Lavalley.

«The experience I have obtained by the long years of residence in this country»—wrote Lavalley to our Government—«has given me the most intimate conviction of the uselessness of acting in a moderate and political manner; and so as not to continue being the sport of false and cunning proceedings, I take the liberty of pointing out we must either abandon our reclamations or support them with the energy and decision to which we have indisputable right by their justice and by the carelessness and

contempt with which we have seen corresponded so far our moderation and courtesy».

The Government of Chile understanding the reason that sided with its Minister authorized him to proceed with energy.

Among the many Chilean citizens, unjustly persecuted and injured by the Peruvian authorities, there was the rich merchant Sr. Domingo Allende, reduced to penury by the exactions in his interests and persecutions of his person.

Not satisfied with this the Governor of Lima had him imprisoned as a suspicious vagrant and prepared his expulsion from the country.

Sr. Lavalle intervened at this time, at first in a friendly way, but as he did not obtain satisfaction, he sent to the Governor the following communication:

«... The time has come, then, for this demands and protests, unheard in the courteous and moderate language I have always used, to be expressed with the energy and force to which Chile has uncontested right by *the indifferent and even hostile attitude* of the Peruvian authorities towards Chile. **My country**, as you must know, **has suf-**

ferred in silence until now the outrages inferred to her in Peru, not because she is not zealous in fulfilling her duties, or for lack of enough energy to make her voice heard in protection of her trampled privileges, but to **keep at all costs the friendship and good harmony to which sister and neighbourly nations are called.**

«As my Government has seen that its constant benevolence and moderation are useless and that the *respects and considerations due to a nation that has done something for the independence, welfare and freedom of Peru* are forgotten, it is not possible to carry further such forbearance nor to ignore so many outrages, principal cause of the bad situation created to Chilean citizens in Peru.

«If in this proceeding there is something untoward, the blame must be laid on the Peruvian Government, which making of external relations something to be disregarded, is absent for long terms and at great distances from the capital, leaving authorities empowered for anything but to answer in due form the complaints and reclamations provoked by the excesses of sub-

ordinates against citizens of other countries...»

Lavalle was perplexed in front of the strange and unexplained hate manifested by the Peruvian people against Chileans.

ABSURD TALES CIRCULATED ON SECRET PURPOSES OF CHILE (1842)

The most absurd tales and suppositions were propagated about the *secret purposes* of the Government of Chile, and all were accepted with wonderful credulity.

To give one example.

At the end of November 1842, came to Santiago Sr. Tomás Cipriano Mosquera, Minister of the Republic of New Granada (later Colombia) whose mission was to obtain a treaty of friendship, commerce, navigation and maritime postal service between both countries, and to ask the mediation of Chile for a peaceful agreement between Peru and Ecuador.

The Peruvian Government giving free bridle to its imagination prodigal in suspicions and ill-intentioned suppositions on

anything related to Chile, thought that a great plot was being prepared against Peru.

«General La Fuente has told me, said Lavalle to the Government of Chile, that men like Lazo, Mariategui, general Vidal and general Nieto, believe with the greatest faith that the mission of general Mosquera to Chile has in view to treat the *establishment of american monarchies* and they accuse our Government to have *the intention of dividing Peru* so as to obtain an *easier preponderance over her*. If general La Fuente himself had not told me that he had heard these gentlemen speak with great solemnity about this and that they were considering the means of opposing our movements, procuring before anything a fleet superior to ours, I would have thought that these were children's tales, because only children can give credence to such fictions. Fortunately general La Fuente calmed their fears making them see how unfounded they were, and they have recovered their calm».

Shortly afterwards, Lavalle said:

«I fail to understand how such ideas, that have not a single fact as foundation,

are accepted by men that are considered wise. Naturally this is not to be wondered when there are even absurder notions that are completely accepted, like this one: That the invariable and constant policy of the Government of Chile towards Peru is to maintain her in perpetual civil war and disorder, so as to be never organized.

«If anyone had told me that in the Government and among men with common sense such opinions were current, I would have received the news with contempt; but Sr. Osma himself and two Councillors of State have been heard by me to cast such an aspersion on the sentiments and capacity of our Government.

«If there was any interest for Chile in the destruction of Peru there would be some basis for such an insult; but as it cannot be justified even with such an excuse—because I do not think that anyone will believe this—it is impossible to think that there is good faith in those who propagate such absurdity.»

Disillusioned and tired by such a useless task, with his patience finished, Lavalle asked his recall from our Government.

CHILE ASKS THE PAYMENT OF THE OLD DEBT OF PERU

Lavalle was replaced by Sr. Manuel Camilo Vial sent as Chargé d’Affairs to Lima. Vial was an active and energetic man, and initiated with vigour the defense of Chilean interests and of our countrymen unjustly persecuted.

Chileans were forced without consideration to serve in the Peruvian ranks. Vial whose briskness, activity and energy were not impaired by official red-tape, considered that Lavalle had not been energetic and diligent enough in the defence of Chilean interest and wrote to the Government saying: The exactions and scandalous abuses committed every day against Chileans, have reached the limit.

«I can assure, without fear of being mistaken, that Chileans have had no protec-

tion, especially those of the poorer classes; that outrages and vexations have no limit; **that from the Supreme Chief to the least subordinate have an odious prevention against Chileans and think themselves authorized for anything.** . . «

Thanks to his active efforts, hundreds of Chileans were liberated and repatriated. At the same time Vial worked with zeal to obtain the payment of the old debt of Peru which we have already considered, but without any results.

Soon after, he returned to the country and took charge of the Interior and Foreign Departments under President Bulnes.

Since the discovery of the guano we have already mentioned, the financial situation of Peru was greatly ameliorated. The Government of Chile, with the most unexceptionable titles, demanded from Peru the payment of about seven million dollars, **enormous sum for our country**, if consideration is given that at the time this money was lent the **total revenues of the country did not exceed one million.** This meant then the fiscal revenue of seven years,

More still. Chile who was the poorest country of America at that time, had spent *over 10 million dollars*, to cover the expenses of the expeditions sent to help Peru, and this had been obtained by means of internal taxation, only way of obtaining loans at the time.

But of this no mention was made; the payment demanded by the Government of Chile was only for loans in money, taken from the loans made by British capitalists and on which Chile was paying interests and capital, grievously burdening our incipient Public Finance.

All our diplomats, one after the other, had failed in obtaining an agreement for the payment of this debt.

PERUVIAN POLICY OF RETARD AND PROTRACTION (1847)

The Government of Peru evidenced a rare uniformity in a system of retardation and postergations that disheartened first Lavalle, then Vial and later Sr. José Ramón Cerda. In the Peruvian diplomacy could be seen a unity of purpose passing from one administration to the next, and that by perpetuation seemed to make very doubtful the hopes of an honourable settlement.

They shielded themselves saying that Congress had not approved the necessary measures and also that the money had been spent in a common cause where Chile had the same interests as Peru.

Sr. Diego José Benavente, distinguished internationalist of that time, who had been

Finance Minister of the Bulnes administration, was sent as Chilean representative to the American Congress organized by the Government of Peru for 1847.

At the end of the sessions of the Congress, to which concurred only Chile, Ecuador, New Granada (Colombia), Bolivia and Peru, Sr. Benavente, left in Lima as Chilean Minister, addressed all his efforts to the definite solution of the debt and disheartened also by the dilatory system of the Peruvian Foreign Office asked to be replaced.

The Government of Chile tired with these endless negotiations and the Peruvian tactics of tiring out all efforts, decided to end in any manner and obtain what she could, giving instructions to Benavente in this sense.

This happy decision of the Chilean Government put an end to this transaction. By means of a considerable reduction in the amount of the debt, a protocol was signed between Sr. Benavente and Sr. Ferreyros, fixing the manner of payment and the amount for which the debt was compromised.

The Foreign Minister of Peru Sr. Felipe Pardo, informing Congress of this advantageous settlement, said that it was *a success of the Peruvian negotiator Sr. Ferreyros.*

FRIENDLY INTERLUDE (1852)

Fortunately for both peoples, at this time assumed the Presidency of the Peruvian Republic general Castilla, who had been twice in Chile as a political proscrip̄t and had personally known her men, gauging their good will and having in consequence frank sympathy for our country and esteem for her men.

He had a close friendship with President Bulnes and kept with him intimate correspondence; in a word, Castilla was a friend of Chile.

Minister Lavalle had written a year before to the Government:

«If general Castilla takes the helm mayhap some day we will see between Chile and Peru **true relations of friendship that have never existed so far.**»

With Castilla started a new era of friend-

ship and cordiality, continued by his successor general Echenique, nobly helped in this task by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, general Torrico.

The Minister of Chile in Lima, Sr. Bernardino J. de Toro said of this last:

«General Torrico is a man in whom—I can say without fear of being mistaken—I will always find the greatest benevolence and facilities for all the affairs to be discussed.»

Nevertheless, public sentiment had not altered in Peru.

Referring to the bloody encounters of the revolution of 1851 in Chile, Minister Toro said:

«...It can be imagined that these news have not been lamented in Peru. **We are for this country an object of great jealousy and rancour** and there are hopes among many that they will see us involved in an interminable series of revolutions...»

But we are pleased to say that the Peruvian Government was at this time fulfilling faithfully its obligations.

In the report presented to the Chilean Congress in 1852, the Minister of Interior

and Foreign Affairs Sr. Antonio Varas, says, referring to Peru:

«Of all sister Republics, that of Peru is the one who has most relations with Chile, and by her position, products and administrative management is called to maintain them very close and cordial.

«The debt recognized by Peru has commenced earning interests from January of present year and the Peruvian Government, impulsed by friendly sentiments has made the first payment of interests, advancing the term fixed, sending drafts to be paid in London covering the interests of the whole year.

«A negotiation has been initiated with the same Government to agree on the total cancellation of the debt with due regard to mutual interests.

«At the beginning of this year the Peruvian Chargé d’Affairs in Chile delivered in the name of his Government, the medals accorded by the Congress of Peru to the President of Chile at the time and to the chiefs and officers of the army that obtained the victory of Yungay.»

The Government of Chile fostered this friendship and regarded with the greatest interest all that tended to consolidate it and make it closer still.

Diplomatic relations of Peru with Ecuador and Bolivia had been on several occasions very near armed rupture. As in former occasions the Government of Chile offered its good offices and moved all its legitimate influences and friendly relations with the sister Republics to avoid the horrors of a war between them.

The moment was near when the Peruvian nation would see at her feet the yawning abyss of a reivindicational war, whose first operations were started by the Spanish seizing the richest source of wealth of Peru; a moment when Chile, this friend of the *nubilla tempus*, always ready to lend her support in difficult times for the Peruvian nationality, would enter alone in the struggle in defense of Peru.

WAR WITH SPAIN (1864)

The state of permanent agitation of some of the American Republics, since their political independence, had given at this time impulse to the secret projects of monarchical Europe which did not believe in the sincerity and solidity of republican spirit and vigour of the democratic institutions of the new States of America; hence giving place to the hope that tired at last of internal struggles they would at the end abandon the new system and would turn towards the old European countries asking for protection.

Even among Americans there were some statesmen who believed that the remedy for discord and all the ills of the state of almost permanent revolt, were to be found in the institutions of civilized Europe.

Nobody will wonder with this antecedents

that the Government of the United States warned the Diplomatic Agent of Peru on the intention of Spain of provoking what was called a *reversion* in America.

The successful essay made in Santo Domingo stimulated this purpose of the Madrid Government and the close vinculations of friendship and family relations with Peruvians, of some prominent men, together with the dominant agitation in her internal politics, concurred to present Peru as the most likely country to carry out the aims of the Spanish Government.

The wealth of Peru and the attendant, almost foregone consequence, the corruption of the country, made the carrying out of these projects more tempting and easy. It seemed moreover that the splendour and luxury of the old Virreynato, to which the society of Lima was trained, did not run well with the democratic organization of the Republic.

General Zavala, one of the Spanish Ministers, born in Peru, brother of a Peruvian general and brother-in-law of Sr. Osmá, Foreign Minister of Peru, was the principal

instigator, it seems, of the plan of reivindication that was being canvassed.

Some prominent public men of Peru, tired of mutinies and revolutions had reached the conviction that their country was unprepared for self-government and to this current of opinion, that we might call honest, was joined the mass of dissatisfied, traitors and unscrupulous elements of all societies.

It was freely said, and the press repeated it, that the Spanish Government had elements in Peru, thanks to the influence of general Zavala and some influential Peruvians who made a point of insulting the liberal spirit of the century, by constituting themselves the defenders of the colonial government.

On the other hand steps were carried in Mexico, Central America and Ecuador in the same direction and the Spanish Government was making efforts to interest France in this enterprise. But France gained the initiative in the Treaty of London and instituted the first monarchy in America on her own account, with the help of Austria, so as to hinder the re-establishment of the

exclusive power of Spain in the American continent.

It is to the praise of Chile, that while in Spain nobody counted on her for the realization of such plans, all the American Republics, the United States included, had confidence in the energy and patriotism of the Chileans and counted with the support of Chile in favour of the American cause.

We will note a fact here as a sample of the monarchical influence to be felt at the time in America.

The Chargé d’Affairs of Colombia in Peru, officially informed to our representative in Lima Sr. José Victorino Lastarria, in June 1863, that «*the Minister of France baron Goury de Roslan, had notified to his Government that the Emperor Napoleon III could not accept that the Republic of Ecuador could enter to form a part of the Union of Colombian States.*»

It was thought that this followed a secret intelligence between the Emperor and President García Moreno of Ecuador. The Minister of Chile answering to the representative of Colombia, who tried to reach an

understanding in view of the evidence that—by force and corruption—Europe seemed to have the purpose of attempting against the sovereignty and republican interests of America, said:

As to the means to be adopted to avoid the consummation of such felony, on which the Chargé d’Affairs of Colombia wishes to have an agreement with the Chilean Legation, the undersigned believes more compatible with the policy of the American Continent and the obligation of each state of not interfering with the internal affairs of another, to make a declaration of the American States, similar to that made by the President of the United States, Monroe, against all intervention of Europe in the private affairs of America.

All these circumstances contributed to the calling of a new American Congress, that at the invitation of the Peruvian Government was invited to session in Lima in 1864, of which we will treat later.

Let us see meanwhile, how the purposes of reversion were being put in practice.

The 14th. April 1864 the Spanish squadron in the Pacific, formed by the frigates *Resolución* and *Triunfo*, without justified cause or previous declaration of war took possession of the Chincha islands, the most valuable source of wealth of Peru, by its guano deposits.

This attempt against the sovereignty of the Peruvian nation, caused in Chile a general movement of indignation in which people and Government alike participated.

The independence of Chile had been recognized by Spain by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in Madrid the 25th. April 1844, by the President of the Spanish Council Sr. Luis González y Bravo and the Chilean Plenipotentiary general José Manuel Borgoño and the relations between both countries were in a period of frank expansion and cordiality.

The Government of Peru on the contrary had not been able to obtain in a formal manner and in conformity with diplomatic procedure the reestablishment of her relations with Spain.

The last step in this sense, made by Sr. José Joaquín de Osma, sent as Plenipoten-

tiary Minister to the Court of Madrid, had failed before the refusal of the Spanish Council to recognize him before signature of a treaty resuming in a solemn and official manner the diplomatic relations between both Governments.

This failure was more marked on account of figuring in the Spanish gabinet general Zavala, whose manifest deference and simpaty to Peru were doubly clear by reason of his being born in Peru brother of a general of that country and brother-in-law of the Peruvian Plenipotentiary himself.

Referring to this the Spanish historian Sr. Pedro Novoa y Colson says:

«Fortunately the Government of Spain took careful account of the lack of basis and seriousness that characterize Peru, where a simple political change was enough to unmake all agreements. It is true that when Chile negotiated the recognition of her independence (1844) her representative obtained by exception permission to present his credentials before ratification of the treaty. But Chile was guaranteed

not only by her superior seriousness but by the fact of having recognized many years before the Spanish debt, moved by a sentiment of equity and justice (1).

«The Republic of Chile is and has always been from her constitution the most wise and discreet of South America. Her dedication to commerce and industry, her respect of her institutions... etc.»

After the failure of the negotiations of the Peruvian Plenipotentiary near the Court of Madrid, the Government of Peru refused on its part to receive Sr. Salazar y Mazarredo in his character of Special Commissioner of the Queen of Spain, according to him only the character of Confidential Agent.

This incident coincided with the arrival

(1) In effect in the Clause IV of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed by Spain and Chile, it is said: *Considering that the Republic of Chile by law of the 17th. November 1835 has recognized freely and spontaneously as a debt of the Nation, the debts contracted by the Government and authorities of Spain in Chile during the war... establishing general regulations for its payment; the provisions of the said Law will be considered as incorporated in the present Treaty».*

at Callao of the Spanish fleet commanded by Admiral Pinzon. Sr. Salazar y Mazarredo went on board the fleet and without delays or ceremonies went to the Chíncha islands and took possession of them by *title of reivindicación*.

Among the considerations of the statement or declaration of the Spanish Commissioner, were the following:

«Considering that the Government of Her Catholic Majesty has not recognized the independence of Peru, by fault of the Government of the Republic, and that according to the expression of one of her publicists, the truce continues only in fact;

«Considering that the property of the said islands can be *reivindicated* by the Government of Her Majesty, with a similar right as that sanctioned by Great Britain on returning the islands of Fernando Poo, Annobon, etc.

The Foreign Minister of Peru Sr. Juan Antonio Ribeyro, on getting news of the occupation addressed the 16th April, 1864, a protest to the Diplomatic Corps resident in Lima.

Among the first to answer was the Chilean

representative, Sr. José Nicolás Hurtado, who said:

«In such extraordinary case, unforeseen in my instructions, I believe I would be a misinterpreter of the sentiments of high americanism manifested at all times by the Government and people of Chile, if I limited myself to express that I will immediately communicate to my Government the contents of the note of the Peruvian Government informing on all the incidents related to this grave question, assuring that it will be matter of the most careful consideration of my Government.

«But besides that I declare that the Chincha islands will be considered as integrant party of the Peruvian territory and that I do not recognize to Spain the right of reivindication invoked as title or as one of the reasons for occupation, by the Especial Commissioner and the Admiral of the fleet of Spain in the Pacific.»

And in a note to the Chilean Government Sr. Hurtado said: To act in this way I have taken account that I am the representative of a nation who helped with her arms to

the rupture of the rights that Spain pretends now to reivindicat on Peru; and that at all times the Government and people of Chile have been the most zealous guardian of the independence of South Americans republics».

The Minister of Chile not only recorded his protest as representative of his Government, but also provoked a reunion of the Diplomatic Corps, which under the presidency of its dean Mr. Christopher Robinson, Minister of the United States, decided to make a joint declaration stating that «in view of the impossibility of obtaining instructions from their Governments in time, they sincerely lamented that the Commissioner and Chief Commander had not adjusted their proceedings to what is provided by International Law for such cases; that they did not accept the right of reivindicacion invoked as one of the reasons for the occupation, and will continue considering the Chincha islands as belonging to Peru, while their respective Governments decide what they consider fitting».

This declaration was signed by Christopher Robinson (U. S. A.); Tho. R. Eldreg-

ge (Ch. d'A. Hawaii); W. M. Sttaford Ter-
ringham (Ch. d'A. Great Britain), Juan
de la Cruz Benavente (M. of Bolivia) and
J. Nicolás Hurtado, (Ch. d'A. of Chile).

The Declaration and the subsequent steps
of the Diplomatic Corps represented by a
commission formed by the representatives
of France, Great Britain and Chile, gave
as result that in the communications of the
chief of the Spanish fleet no further mention
was made of reivindication, declaring ins-
tead that the islands had been taken as a
measure of *reprisal*.

This was a great step but as the retirement
by the Spanish Admiral of the principle of
reivindication, took away in a certain sense
the American character it had been given,
the Peruvian Government, **publicly disau-
thorized the diplomatic corps.**

The Chilean Minister in Lima, reporting
to the Government on these incidencies
said:

«In the reunion of the Diplomatic Corps
the matter was discussed and it was agreed
that before anything, it was necessary to
know the wishes of the Government regard-
ing agreements that could give peaceful

and honourable solution to the difficulties. To this end the English Minister and myself were commissioned. The English Minister had inconvenienced to accompany me and gave me a written power and I went alone to confer with Sr. Ribeyro. I manifested the wishes of the Diplomatic Corps and asked his opinion on the matter. Sr. Ribeyro manifested the keen appreciation of his Government of the solicitude and interest of the Diplomatic Corps and extensively explained the good intentions of the Government to settle in a peaceful and decorous manner the difficulties with Spain. As to the terms of settlement, the matter being so serious, he asked for time to consult H. E. the President and his colleagues and leave the matter open until an agreement with them was reached.

«On the next day I saw him again, accompanied by the English Minister and being already in accord with the President and his colleagues he repeated the former opinions and ratified them.

«We reported the result of our mission to the Diplomatic Corps and it was decided

by unanimity to send a commission to the Admiral and Commissioner, in confidential mission to confer with them on the situation, to gather the final purpose of their proceedings and to try to obtain the arrangement. The Dean who had to appoint the commission designated for this the representatives of England, France and Chile.

«The commission set out without giving notice to the Government, as agreed by the Diplomatic Corps, so as not to give to this step a humiliating character to the Peruvian Government. It was wished that it could never be said that the offended was proposing settlement to the aggressor, but only that the neutrals were spontaneously offering a honourable solution of difficulties.»

A few days after, the President of the Republic in a speech to the people of Lima said what follows:

«Fellow citizens: The Government is busy reuniting the necessary elements to expel the Spaniards from the islands and avenge the offense made to the National Colours. **I have taken no part in the last diplomatic events.** The Iquique is here

we do not know how, as the Government has refused to receive it. (1)

«This ship had a flag, a commander, a Peruvian garrison, and while national honour is not duly satisfied, that ship can remain where it is until it sinks or disappears. (The People: Let it sink! Let it sink!).

«They have published a declaration, but the Government or the nation can have no faith in it, because having once lied, they will always lie.

«The echo of sympathy that in the illustrious people of Chile has found the outrage made to our flag—and that will be propagated in all America—is a sure proof that the independence of the continent is for ever secured». (Long life Peru and Chile!)

There is no need of giving opinion on the discretion and convenience of this presidential allocution; it serves only to give proof of the disauthorization made in an emphatic and unusual manner of the steps of the Diplomatic Corps.

(1) This ship had been taken by the Spanish fleet at the time of seizing the islands, and thanks to the steps of the Diplomatic Corps, had been returned to the Peruvian Government which refused to receive it.

The Minister of Chile protested to the Foreign Minister of Peru, on the truth of facts being altered in such manner, but without allowing this to diminish his enthusiasm and sympathy for the cause of Peru, as can be seen by the following noble and knightly answer to an invitation made by the Spanish Admiral, to a new conference, as a member of the Diplomatic Corps.

«The position of the undersigned, says the Minister of Chile, is not exactly equal to that of his colleagues, *as his quality of representative of an American Republic—keeping as yet good relations with Spain—who is a sister of Peru and is very nearly and deeply affected by the events of Chincha* makes the duty of the undersigned to ask the General Commander of the fleet as to the possible results of the interview. The reunion proposed now by the Commander has in view questions related to citizens of foreign nations, residing in those islands or is it likely that the agreement proposed before and treated in the first conference can be reached to? *If it is only for the first, the undersigned, before the high and great considerations of the honour of Peru, bro-*

ther people of Chile, would be in the painful neccessity of not attending the interests of his countrymen residing in the islands, which have been placed under care of the British Vice-Consul, and of refusing the proposed interview.»

The tone of loyalty, nobility and high-mindedness in which this communication is worded, corresponded with exact fidelity to the sentiments and attitude of the people and Government of Chile.

This decided attitude of Chile, the only country to manifest with positive facts her americanism and fraternal sympathy for the Peruvian nation, made her very soon the target of the ires of the Spanish Admiral.

Very soon we would see the destruction of the principal commercial port of Chile by the Spanish fleet.

GREAT DEMONSTRATIONS IN PERU OF GRATITUDE TO CHILE

We have said already that the attempt against the sovereignty of Peru by the Spanish fleet's seizure of the Chincha islands, caused in Chile deep and general indignation. From one end to the other of the country the echo of protest was heard against the insult to the Peruvian flag and open sympathy was expressed for our brothers of the Rimac.

The news of this attitude of the Chilean people caused in Peru a general movement of enthusiasm and gratitude, shown in parades, acts of thanksgiving, acclamations to the Chilean representative, to the people and to the Government of Chile, etc.

«In front of the warlike demonstrations of Chile—wrote our Minister—who with so much nobleness has taken up the gaunt-

let of reconquest thrown by Spain, this people has felt humiliated, and abandoning his apathy, has started all sort of demonstrations of gratitude to the Chilean people; his patriotism has been reawakened and—what did not happen at the beginning—does not want to hear again of settlement but wants war—a rapid and terrible war.

«On the night of the 11th. over two thousand persons demonstrated in front of my house, with bands and banners... etc.»

Here are some of the speeches made during the great demonstration of the people of Lima to the Minister of Chile. The Great Marshal don Antonio de la Fuente, Mayor of Lima said:

«The Municipal Council of Lima, echo of the wishes of the people, comes with the greatest satisfaction to congratulate in the person of his representative, the Chilean people who with so much decision has offered to help wipe out the offense made by the Spanish nation to Peru, planting again the standard of Pizarro in the lands of the Incas.

«The Chilean people was always ready

to pour his blood in union with the Peruvians when we must attack those who have dared offend our independence and liberty.

«This is mayhap the third time in which both peoples in union call to the whole America to unite in the strongest links of confraternity to oppose the exaggerated pretensions of European monarchies.

*«The Council expects that the Chilean Minister will **express to the people of Chile the eternal gratitude and deep recognizance of the people of Peru,** and especially that of Lima, which I represent now».*

The Minister of Chile answered in the following terms:

«...Under the flag of Union and using the most sacred of rights of the people—that of exerting by himself his sovereignty and directing his own destinies—Latin America constituted herself and was recognized by the whole world as a free and independent region.

«The palms of Ayacucho and Junin were obtained with the blood of Chileans, Peruvians, Argentineans and Colombians. All

was common in that great epoch: triumphs and defeats; mournings and rejoicings... *The people of Peru can be sure that the Government and people of Chile will be on the side of Peru in the questions affecting her independence and sovereignty.»*

As a delicate proof of the refined courtesy of the ladies of Lima, we take the following from a local paper of the time: «At two o'clock about eight thousand persons congregated in the theatre. Sr. Andraca, councillor of the town, after acclaiming the flags of Chile and Peru said he had heart to feel but no eloquence and in impassioned phrases stated that the American Union was an accomplished fact. A young lady sent then a wreath of roses to adorn the flag of Chile».,

The papers of Lima filled their columns with expressions of gratitude to Chile and eternal vows of recognizance towards the Chilean nation: there was wastage of gratitude.

We say wastage, because having then the people of Lima made patent his gratitude, *six years later was signed in Lima the secret treaty of alliance with Bolivia*

against the same Chilean people acclaimed with such delirious enthusiasm.

Before reaching this sad page of the Peruvian friendship, let us present the manifestations of gratitude of the Peruvian people, that led to expect days of unalterable and brotherly friendship which to-day are only remembrances of happy hours of a passing idyl.

El Mercurio of Lima said then: «Last night most of the inhabitants of Lima invaded the central streets and with great enthusiasm went to the residence of the Minister of Chile to manifest **the immense gratitude felt by the Peruvian people for that of Chile by the marked proofs given of deference to our cause...**

«We see that as soon as the news of the events have reached high-minded Chile, so zealous of her liberty and privileges, when, standing and resolute, she looks face to face to Spain and accepts with firm countenance the call. Those that triumphed in Chacabuco and Maipo cannot accept that a daring hand defiles the palms sown with the Peruvians in the glorious fields of victory that are the pride of the people of

the Incas. Peru recognizes in the Chileans the old companions of her glory, that with her shared defeats and victory, *and with the deepest emotion of gratitude and also of American pride she has received the most eloquent demonstrations of the sympathy that our national cause has found in that truly brotherly people*».

The people of Callao also manifested in the following act his gratitude to Chile:

«In Callao the 12th. of May 1864, the citizens spontaneously convened... considering the high patriotism and remarkable fraternity of the Chilean people... decided to give a vote of thanks to the Chilean people... for the spontaneous reprobation manifested before the outrage... and **protest that the sons of Callao will be the first to fly to the help of Chile**... etc.»

Similar acts were made in different towns of Peru. The Society of Founders of the Independence sent the following communication to the Chilean Minister:

«We have felt the most great joy on hearing of the enthusiasm of the illustrious people of Chile and the decision of avenging the unmerited outrage made to his brothers

of Peru... The glorious remembrance of the great sacrifices made together...

...«We are honoured by expressing our cordial gratitude to the patriotic people of Chile... for his republican sentiments and sympathy to our cause...»

PERU ASKS THE HELP OF CHILE (1864)

Meanwhile, what were the measures of the Peruvian Government to wash with blood—as expressed by the President to the people—the offense received?

According to the official reports of Sr. Hurtado to the Government of Chile the situation is painted as follows:

«Sr. Ribeyro has explicitly told me his hope that Chile will lend to Peru in this occasion all the support, all the help possible and asked me not only to transmit this hope but to cooperate to that end. Some days before the President had asked me the same...

«After the agitation of the first days things are calmer and the Government that does not feel itself strong in the interior and without elements enough to recover

the Chincha islands by force, vacillates, fluctuates and does not dare adopt any definitive measure.

«In conformity with the opinion of the country, manifests that it wishes the war and burns with the desire of washing with blood the offenses received by Peru from the Spanish fleet. To these ends it has bought the steamer Quito from the English company and arms it; the Loa is protected with rails; Callao is fortified, etc. . . . Yet besides the open facts to demonstrate to the country that the Government has the firm purpose of going to war, there are others less open, some of which are kept in reserve and hidden, which convince those that are in the secret, not only that the sole wish of the Government is to regain the islands by a peaceful agreement but also that it works unceasingly in this sense. . . .»

DOUBLE GAME OF THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT AND FORTUNATE SPECULATIONS (1864).

A few days after, Hurtado wrote: «The conduct of this Government regarding the events of Chincha and its relations with the chief of the Spanish fleet, is until now undecided and dark».

The attitude of the Peruvian Government was enough to perplex the most sagacious diplomatist. While it manifested to the people its purpose of avenging the outrage, it was using its agents in Europe to obtain directly a friendly agreement with the Spanish Cabinet.

In Lima there was general belief that with this double game some fortunate speculations had been carried through. On the news of friendly negotiations of the Peruvian agents in Europe reaching the markets of Paris and London, the Peruvian

bonds experimented considerable rises of which advantage was taken by those in the secret. Two or three months after the mails brought news of the warlike preparations of Peru and the downward movement commenced...

What participation had in all this the Cabinet presided by Sr. Ribeyro? What reason had the Peruvian Chamber to approve by 80 votes against 3 the resolution declaring the Cabinet «*traitor to the public confidence*»? We do not know, but the press and public opinion of Peru made the most serious charges to the Cabinet.

The Government of Peru since the 14th April, date of the occupation of the Chincha islands, up to the end of August had given no signs of life and pretended that the Government of Chile, **which was not the offended nor had means of action for a successful offensive**, started an open struggle with Spain.

It was an open secret that Chile had no war elements to oppose any resistance to the Spanish fleet. Her undefended ports and two or three wooden ships were not surely the elements to inspire fear to the Spanish navy.

THE PUBLIC POWERS OF PERU LEND MORE ATTENTION TO INTERNAL POLITICS THAN TO THE WAR.

Let us see the attitude of public powers of Peru. On the 11th. August, Sr. Hurtado wrote to the Government of Chile: «During the days elapsed since my last communication, *the Congress of this country has treated only affairs of internal politics, leaving the consideration of foreign affairs until the fall of the Cabinet is obtained.*»

The President wished by all means to maintain Ribeyro in the Foreign Office, but in view of the accusation of treason to the public confidence made against the whole Cabinet by almost the whole Chamber, he desisted and called new men to the Government.

Twenty days after the new Cabinet was organized, Hurtado wrote:

«The political situation has not altered. The Government has taken no decision, neither has the Congress, regarding the Spanish question. The public sessions of the Chamber are without interest, and the secret ones to judge by what some senators and deputies have told me and by what the press says, *are very far from corresponding to the importance and gravity of the affairs pending.*»

The 17th. September, the Congress of Peru put an end to incertitude and vacillations resolving that the «Executive make war to the Government of Spain as the last means to obtain the most complete and honourable satisfaction for the offenses that her agents have given to the Republic, in case that the Chincha islands are not evacuated and the national flag saluted.»

This declaration of the Peruvian Congress did not change however the order of things. The political disorganization; the lack of patriotism patent in all acts of directing men, maintained public spirit depressed and made barren all efforts and initiatives. It seems that the ideal of the leaders was to remain in power.

El Peru, a Lima newspaper said in its editorial of the 11th June 1864: «The several Councils of Ministers that took place after the 16th. April, day in which we knew of the outrage of the islands, adopted resolutions that were known to all. We all knew what had been discussed and the opinions of the majority. *There was one Minister who considering Peru completely incapable for defense and the Peruvians devoid of patriotism to repel the Spanish aggression, condemned all proposals to place the country on the ground of dignity and reparation of the outrage. Another, aping taciturnity and stoical indifference and disdain for the fate and honour of the country, only opened his lips to mock the general enthusiasm and to wound the noblest sentiments of the people. There was even a Minister that alleging prudence «opposed all measure tending to war.»* In respect of truth we must say that the other two ministers were on the side of energetical and efficient measures.

«We have then, that the majority of the Council of Ministers had the opinion in

the days following the 16th April that *any agreement was more convenient than the loss of power by them.*»

CHILE IS ATTACKED AND CHARGED OF TREASON AND COMPLICITY WITH SPAIN (1864).

The Peruvians, as easy to be impressed as quick to judge their friends in the hours of difficulty, commenced now a sudden campaign of attacks to the Government of Chile because it did not declare war to Spain.

They did not take any account of the quixotism of such action when there were no elements to cause any damage to the adversary.

The Peruvian Government that for interest of the internal politics wished to present itself as abandoned by Chile—to calm the partisans of war that charged it of cowardice and weakness and were trying to depose it—gave orders to the Lima papers *El Comercio* and *El Mercurio*,—

which were paid by the Government and one of them directed by an official of Foreign Affairs—to attack in an insulting manner the Government of Chile charging it of **complicity with the enemies of America.**

On giving information to the Government of this insidious campaign of the press, the Minister of Chile in Lima said. «These antecedents and others that I omit, made patent to me that the attitude of the press against the Government of Chile, was a manoeuver of the Government for reasons of internal politics, *as aiming to dispel agitation and dismiss preoccupations in the interior they did not hesitate to present Chile in front of the rest of the continent and of Europe as a traitor to the American cause.* There is no other explanation, as for the external policy such system was prejudicial to the cause of Peru, who appearing alone gave stimulus to her adversaries, etc. . . . »

COMPLETE SATISFACTIONS GIVEN TO THE CHILEAN REPRESENTA- TIVE.

At the same time the Minister of Chile sent a protest to the Foreign Minister of Peru on this so to say *official* campaign against the Government of Chile saying:

«The undersigned cannot hide the transcendental consequences of the fact that the Government of Peru instead of cooperating to tighten the confidence of the two governments, *sends to the rest of the continent and to Europe the charge of treason made against the Government of Chile, a country where the blot of treason is unknown, who has always been the most zealous guard of the independence and sovereignty of America and of her republican institutions, who for this cause spent the blood of her sons and wasted her treasury at the side of Peru*

in more than one occasion; to a Government in a word, that in presence of the events of Chíncha has manifested to yours by means of the undersigned in the conference of the 12th of the past month, not only the solemn protest for the proceedings effected in the islands and the false principles established in the declaration of the 14th but also its decision of coming to the help of Peru to the defense of her independence and sovereignty, this being the true aspect of the question; which later has formulated in a solemn manner its policy in its circular communication to the American Governments of the 4th of May, etc....»

On the following day *El Mercurio* of Lima gave ample satisfaction to the Chilean representative...

THE CONGRESS OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES. PROMINENT ROLE PLAYED BY THE CHILEAN REPRESENTATIVE SR. MANUEL MONTT. (1864).

In view of the gravity of the conflict in which it was involved and to present to Spain and Europe the sentiment of American solidarity, of fraternal union of the various countries, the Government of Peru quickened the reunion of the American Congress that was to take place in Lima.

The Government of Chile, that had not omitted any sacrifice to see this union carried into practice, being one of the aspirations of its international policy, seconded with enthusiasm and loyalty this purpose and sent as its representative to the said Congress one of the most prominent statesmen of the epoch, whose name in and out of the country, was a manifestation of

the importance and seriousness recognized by the Government of Chile to the Congress and a guarantee of success to it.

In the first days of September 1864 Sr. Manuel Montt was appointed Plenipotentiary Minister in Peru and Delegate to the American Congress.

Sr. Montt had directed our Foreign Affairs during the Bulnes administration and during two successive terms had governed Chile as President of the Republic. It was natural that the Government of Chile looked to him when it was question of such a delicate and responsible mission.

Guided by his patriotic selfdenial for his country and the american cause, Sr. Montt accepted this mission, saying to the Government:

«To go abroad presents serious difficulties for me but I do not take account of them because a mission to Peru at this moment is related to the Spanish-Peruvian question so seriously affecting Peru... Although I esteem very important the commission regarding the American Congress... I have no hopes to follow it to the end if my pre-

sence in Lima is not required by the principal question».

The 17th September sailed from Valparaiso towards Peru, Sr. Montt with the members of the Chilean Delegation who were Sr. Ignacio Zenteno, Sr. José Manuel Balmaceda, Sr. Julio Zegers, Sr. Federico García de la Huerta and Sr. Carlos Montt. The 28th October 1864 the Congress of Plenipotentiaries opened its sessions, with the following representation of the American Republics:

Chile, Sr. Manuel Montt; Venezuela, Sr. Antonio L. Guzman; Colombia, Sr. J. de la C. Benavente; Ecuador, Sr. Vicente Piedrahita. Sr. Domingo F. Sarmiento for Argentine and Sr. Pedro A. Herran for Salvador attended the conferences without powers; the former being later disauthorized privately by the Argentine Government.

The Republic of Ecuador to which the Government of Peru wished by all means to declare war, was invited at the indication and by the steps of the Plenipotentiary of Chile.

It can be said without reserves that the

Chilean Plenipotentiary was the soul of that Congress, the one to harmonize all opinions and to inspire the resolutions of the conference as well as acting as adviser to the Peruvian Government.

COMMUNICATION OF DON MANUEL MONTT, RELATIVE TO HIS IN- STRUCTIONS.

The following is the important diplomatic document in which don Manuel Montt as Chilean plenipotentiary asked the Government for extension and precision of his instructions:

«Santiago, September 13th 1864.—I have received the instructions regarding the mission which I will discharge near the Peruvian Government and although I believe like you, that it is impossible to foresee the thousand eventualities that may occur, I nevertheless think that there are certain points on which a more defined line of conduct could be marked, specially in prevision of events too probable, that would place the Legation in the necessity of answering

without delay or before there is time to consult the Government.

On suggesting to the Peruvian Government that the one of Chile considers the proposals lately made by Spain as depressive and unacceptable, there is the possibility of influencing more or less efficaciously the decision to be taken according to what Chile has to offer or to give hopes on, in the case of a rupture.

The same can be said as to the agreement under which both Governments must proceed. If I can only manifest to Peru interest for her cause or offer only moral support, I must at the same time be exceedingly reserved and measured so as that at no time it can be said that the Government of Chile impelled that of Peru to assume an extreme attitude, giving hopes of a cooperation or help that will not be given.

It is natural also that the Government of Peru will desire to know how far it will be supported by Chile, to regulate its conduct and a systematic reserve on this point would mean a refusal of support, doubtless very disheartening for Peru.

As the role of Chile would be untenable

if nothing can be decided in her name on this matter, I think convenient to have determined the cases and circumstances under which the Government thinks it would have to lend support; Chile is doubtless in a position to influence the Peruvian Government either to the acceptance of a peaceful agreement or to jointly determine the conduct to be followed, but such influence would entirely disappear as soon as for lack of explanation or by an unexplained reserve, the Peruvian Government formed the opinion that it had nothing to expect from Chile in case of an open rupture with Spain.

To measure the disposition of the other American States having representatives in Lima, step that is indispensable, I will have again the difficulty indicated: if Chile wishes to know the intentions of the other States on the Spanish-Peruvian question, they will also want to know those of Chile, and as this is a question of common interest it is impossible to get at their intentions, keeping absolute reserve on our opinion.

Moreover it is very probable that after

the attitude assumed by the Republic on the occupation of Chincha, more than one neighbouring State will wait to know the decision of Chile to adopt a line of conduct and in such situation to keep silent and try only to explore, would signify that there was no intention of lending true help to Peru. There is no doubt that the intention of other States must be previously ascertained but if any one, as an antecedent to the conduct to be adopted, wishes to know what would be the attitude of Chile in case of a rupture, shall silence be kept? Could it not be possible, in answer to such cases to determine at least hypothetically—the attitude to be taken by Chile?

I consider still more necessary an express consideration of the case—mayhap not very remote—of Peru not counting with the support of other American countries and the Spanish forces being augmented in the Pacific; of an intimation in the form of an ultimatum to the Peruvian Government on the acceptance of the proposals of the Spanish Government or of other harder still, giving a short and peremptory term for answer. If in such circumstances the Peru-

vian Government expressed to the Chilean Legation that it was ready to reject the proposals if Chile lent her cooperation and that it would submit to the humiliation only in the contrary case, it would be neither possible or dignified to evade an answer. Silence or not having instructions for such an event, which, given the circumstances, enters among those that must have been foreseen, would mean a disguised negative of support and Chile would be made responsible for the consequences of the decision taken by the Peruvian Government. That such a situation may happen I consider very probable and hence I think it necessary to have a determined rule of conduct to follow.

For the case of a peaceful arrangement you think that the proposals made by admiral Pinzon are acceptable; among these is the salute of the Peruvian flag, and as this was met with the most resistance by the Spanish agents it would be very likely that it is refused at present. If an agreement is made on the disoccupation of the islands without such salute, would this omission be obstacle for my giving cooperation to

such peaceful agreement? The considerations of dignity of the offended nation take a big place in both sides of the Peru-Spanish question and it would not be surprising that it gave rise to dilations.

I will try to know the intentions of Spain and if her peaceful protestations are sincere, but it is easy to see that Lima is not the best field for such investigations. For the aims of the mission it will be very useful to know the aims of Spain, as well as the opinion of England and France, and I hope you will let me know in time all the informations you get on this. It is easy to gauge the influence that in the conduct which Peru will adopt and even in the more or less advantageous solution of the question, will have the opinion formed on the matter by the English and French governments.

I have thought necessary to submit to you the above considerations so as to avoid perturbances in the fulfillment of the mission confided to me. . . .—*Manuel Montt*.

The Government accepted the ideas of Sr. Manuel Montt and placing full confidence in his wisdom and political experience

completed his instructions giving him full liberty of action. «Besides—said the Foreign Minister Sr. Covarrubias—*we always wished you to have the greatest liberty of action possible*, and notwithstanding your observations we believe that the instructions would have given you in any case a sure basis for proceeding».

In the first conference between Sr. Manuel Montt and the Foreign Minister of Peru, this said that «his Government hoped to count in future with his opinion and advise».

PERU WISHES TO DECLARE WAR ON ECUADOR

Very soon the Chilean Plenipotentiary had occasion to use in a noble and generous way his influence on the Peruvian Government, to avoid a crime against americanism: *the war on the Republic of Ecuador*.

«In this situation—writes Sr. Montt—among the public there is decided spirit of declaring war on Ecuador as a means of deposing the Government that in opinion of these people has manifested sympathy towards Spain, etc.. While I receive instructions on this I will put all my efforts to deviate this country from such purpose, that far from taking from Spain a haven for her ships will rather precipitate such result giving Ecuador a pretext to desert the American cause and openly take the side of Spain.

I do not think suitable to the dignity and loyalty of the Peruvian Government to abstain acting against Spain who occupies her islands, and start operations against Ecuador for fear that she may favour the outrage».

Facts very soon justified the observations of Sr. Montt. Ecuador invited to the Congress sent representatives and signed with Peru, Bolivia and Chile the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance against Spain.

RESULTS

The results of the war with Spain are well known. Peru obtained the return of her rich islands and Chile paid the damages with the destruction of Valparaiso, the most flourishing of the ports of the Pacific after San Francisco.

Seven years after Chile received a new proof of Peruvian gratitude: the Secret Treaty of 1873.

THE SECRET TREATY AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE ARGENTINE (1873)

Presisely when the diplomatic relations with Chile were at a point of perfect cordiality and the goverment of Perú appeared as fostering her friendship and presented itself as the best and sincerest of friends making on every occasion elaborate manifestations of deep gratitude to Chile, was signed in Lima on the 6th February 1873 the Secret Treaty of Alliance with Bolivia, some of whose provisions we copy:

«The Republics of Bolivia and Peru wishing to bind in a solemn manner the ties that unite them, augmenting their strength and guaranteeing certain reciprocal rights, they stipulate the present Treaty of Alliance.

.....

«Art. X—The High Contracting Parties

will ask separately or jointly, *when they declare it opportune* by a later agreement, *the adhesion of another or other American States to the present Treaty of defensive Alliance.*

.....
«Additional article.—The present Treaty of defensive Alliance between Bolivia and Peru, *will be kept secret until both High Contracting parties, by joint resolution, judge necessary to publish it.*—*Riva Agüero. —Benavente.*»

Peru who — notwithstanding her great revenues from the guano—was in permanent bankruptcy, owing to the immoderate waste of public moneys and to the unscrupulous management of her governing men, meditated on the convenience for her of having in her hands the monopoly of the guano and of the nitrate, whose exploitation was being initiated in the sea-board, and prepared her plans with the reserve and caution usual to her diplomacy.

The plans of Peru were clear and well matured. The alliance with Bolivia put in her hands the monopoly of guano and nitra-

te, the most abundant source of revenue for the Peruvian Fisc.

To this alliance the Argentine would be invited, she having pending with Chile her frontier suit and whose cooperation would ensure the success of the Peruvian combination.

To carry out this plan the Peruvian Government sent Sr. Manuel Irigoyen to Buenos Aires to obtain the Argentine's adhesion to the Secret Treaty. Fulfilling his mission, Sr. Irigoyen very soon after reaching Buenos Aires sent the following communication to the Foreign Minister of Argentine Sr. Carlos Tejedor:

«Legation of Peru.—N.º 2.—Reserved.
Buenos Aires, September 24th. 1873.

«Hon. Minister:

«The Governments of Peru and Bolivia wishing to closely unite in a solemn manner the ties binding both States, with the aim of mutually guaranteeing their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, celebrated in Lima on the 6th February past, by means of their respective plenipotentiaries, the Treaty of defensive Alliance

that the undersigned has the honour of enclosing with the present, in authentic copy.

.....
«Under this point of view, that doubtless is of the highest interest, the Treaty means the fixing of a great principle of Public Law in America, and may in consequence be considered as the most sure pledge of peace, and union, not only between Peru and Bolivia, but also between the other American States that may adhere to it; and this is of so much more importance at present because as you know **many of these states have pending the fixation of their limits,** and if by fortune the arising questions have so far not had any bad results, they yet *offer difficulties that later may create complications and grave perils that it is convenient to avoid by every means.*

«This was understood by the High Contracting Parties who reserved themselves the right of asking the adhesion of another or others of the States referred to and *have lately agreed to ask the adhesion of the Argentine Republic,* as can be seen by the

documents that in authentic copy are enclosed.

«With this end, and the Bolivian Government not having in this Republic any diplomatic agent, it agreed with that of Peru to confer to the undersigned full powers with the object expressed.

«For these reasons, the undersigned, in fulfillment of the orders received in this sense, has the high honour of soliciting in the name of the Governments of Peru and Bolivia the adhesion of the Government of the Argentine Republic to the Treaty already named of defensive Alliance signed in Lima the 6th February last.—With sentiments of the highest consideration, etc.—*Manuel Irigoyen.*»

THE CLEAN TRADICIONAL POLICY OF ARGENTINE

The adhesion of the Argentine Republic was given by the Chamber of Deputies, but failed in the Senate where the serene influence of Rawson and Mitre obtained the prevalence of the clean traditional policy of Argentine.

These are some paragraphs of the historical letter sent by senator Rawson on this subject to Sr. Plácido Bustamante:

«Fortyeight votes against eighteen have decided last night the adhesion of the Argentine Republic to the secret Treaty of defensive Alliance celebrated by the Governments of Peru and Bolivia.

«By the explanations that you will hear from the Minister, you will appreciate that the reasons advising this adhesion are mainly the aggressive attitude of Chile

with us and that Chile is in reality the object of the alliance, whose consequence will be a war with Chile.

«I do not need to tell you that I have opposed with all my strength the approval given last night and during the sleepless night caused by that decision, *my only hope was that the Senate may save us of what I consider a misfortune for our country* and the best support of that hope is the knowledge I have of your wisdom, clear judgment and patriotism.

«My opinion is that by that Treaty we abandon the wise traditional policy of the Argentine Republic, consisting in the respect of all nationalities, abstaining from intervention or interference in their own affairs. The political alliances, condemned from the times of Washington for America, are acceptable only in the cases of actual war, when common interests of two or more nations fatally force them to associate in a war pact and for the exclusive object of that war, and even in such cases experience has shown—as in the case of Peru and Chile allied against Spain, or Brasil and us allied against Paraguay—that after the war there

remain pending questions between the allies of such gravity that they may seriously endanger the peace of former friends.

«But the present question is not even that. Chile, shows herself aggressive with Bolivia and with Argentine as regards her territorial boundaries. **But Peru that has not and cannot have such questions with Chile, initiates the negotiation of the Alliance Treaty only in a spirit of rivalry and by reasons of maritime preponderance in the Pacific.**

«Peru is looking for allies to check her rival and to humiliate her in case of a war. Bolivia by instinct of preservation and by the traditional deference of her policy to Peruvian influence, enters without hesitation in the league, because not having other outlet for her trade than her sorry possession in the Pacific, she needs a maritime power to defend and guarantee her in the case of a war over the territorial question.

«In these circumstances, those two countries remember that we also have boundary discussions with Chile and they haste to offer us their alliance, inviting us to share their

fate in the road of adventures they have taken, and we accept without conditions a pact formed by the inspiration of interests that are not ours **and conspire darkly and under secrecy against the most advanced Republic of South America, our neighbour, our sister in the struggle of the independence, our friend of today as we maintain cordial political relations and very tight commercial relations with her.**

.....
«But let us suppose that it is not us, but Bolivia the one attacked by Chile, always by reasons of boundaries. We would consider the case as allies and if we considered it within our obligations we would go with our arms to the help of Bolivia; we would make a war on Chile in cold blood, without the enthusiasm of patriotism or of wounded national honour, because in that very probable supposition it would be a question of foreign interests; **we would go to wound by the back with our bayonets, mayhap in the fields of Chacabuco, those that yesterday mixed their blood**

with ours in defense of American independence.

«Can you imagine, my dear friend, what would be the popularity of a war determined by foreign causes **or by a thereotical principle of American equilibrium that before now was conceived only by Solano Lopez and by the corrupt Governments of Peru**, and that now finds place in the councils of our statesmen, in a sad reaction against the modern progress of International Law, denying the recent lessons and the principles conquered by America for the world, that is to say the non-intervention; the laws of neutrality; the arbitration substituting war and the free concurrence of all the countries of the world to the cooperation of liberty, industry and commerce, that are the three strong columns on which rest peace and the true independence of modern peoples.

.....

«Resuming my objections to the alliance I will say: First: that it is anti-politic and blind because it means a provocation, stimulates aggressions, takes from us the moral strength based on the justice of right

and on fairness and prudence in the discussion. Second: It is inefficient in case of a conflict by the slowness and inefficiency of the help stipulated. Third: because it is anti-Argentinean as it limits our sovereignty in more than one point, and specially in the most important of them all, since it would not depend from us to make or not to make a war, if this comes within the stipulations providing aggression to one of the allies. Fourth: **that it is a cowardly policy because it shows the Republic unable to have the virile impulse that was her glory, to attempt by herself great feats and especially to defend her territory and independence».**

.....
Referring next to the efficacy of the help that the possible allies could give in case of a war, he says:

«In the present case the possible and eventual allies cannot give us moral certainty of such efficacy. They are relatively weak. *Peru who pretends to be the maritime power of the Pacific could not send a fleet to protect our ports* because she would have to protect her own and those of Bolivia;

because her ironclads would be sunk by the batteries and torpedoes in the Magellan Straits or else would have to travel round Cape Horn with great disadvantages to the plan.

«She could not help us with her treasury nor with her credit, so deeply involved already—and which would be in a worse position with the war—and all this counting that **the historical egotism and inconsistency natural to that country did not counsel her to abandon us in the lurch and try an easy arrangement with Chile with whom she has no permanent or radical division of interests**».

As we said before the adhesion of the Argentine Republic to the Secret Treaty was not obtained, Sr. Irigoyen failing in this mission.

THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC. ITS ORIGIN AND ITS CAUSES

The Republic of Chile, one of the poorest and most backward of the Spanish colonies, on constituting an independent Republic was the first to establish a regular and orderly Government. It was worthy of notice that while in the other States of America revolutions succeeded one to the other, in the small Republic of the Pacific, the Governments legally filled their terms, without disorders or perturbations, and Chile—as much for the stability of her institutions as by her marked orderly spirit—took first rank among the nations of America.

Of a vigorous and strong race of lofty and daring character, but with peaceful spirit, loving order and peace, Chile did not produce petty tyrants and would have not

tolerated them; in her Government neither chieftainships or dictatorships had a place, her political institutions were well organized and with enough flexibility to resist and overcome the natural difficulties of a society that was barely constituted with individual character, yet they worked with regularity, perfecting themselves and passing—without disorders or agitations—the natural evolution of all political institutions.

The reasons of her progress are to be looked for in the independent but peaceful character of the Chilean people and in the wisdom of her institutions; and so the country put away—like exotical productions—the martial law; *pronunciamientos*; mutinies; dissolution of Congresses and all the plagues that accompany bad governments.

The internal organization of the country; regularization of public finance; fostering and development of public institutions; legislative reforms; exact payment of all obligations; in a word all that constitutes a good public administration were from the first moment the constant thought and strongest aim of our rulers.

The international policy, invariably ins-

pired in sentiments of friendly cordiality, reached in moments of stress to the sacrifice of the nearest and most legitimate interests, for the purpose of keeping peace and good harmony in the American continent.

Her lofty and serene spirit was unperturbed by the attitude more than once aggressive and bellicose of the northern neighbours or by the disputes—always keen and bitter—of the boundary questions.

This traditional policy of the Chilean Government for international relations was not, unfortunately, understood in all its generous scope and on the contrary it was interpreted as being a manifestation of lack of energy and virility from the Chilean people.

«It cannot be denied—people said in Peru—that Chile has made great progress in the cementation of internal peace and the consolidation of her institutions; but these same advances have sapped her military spirit».

The problems of war did not cause insomnia to the rulers of Chile and as it is but natural, her neighbours did not lose sleep on account of her military power.

Before ships, guns and other elements of destruction, the Government of Chile caused scientists to come to Chile to study the country; prominent men of science to teach in our colleges all the branches of knowledge.

It is enough to remember the names of Claude Gay, the geologist and naturalist Philippi, the astronomer Moesta, the geographer Pissis. And among Americans, Bello and Sarmiento.

The always increasing prosperity of Chile and her growing reputation abroad as orderly and laborious people, awakened undissembled emulation and rivalry among her neighbours of the Rimac.

But unfortunately, instead of addressing their efforts to correct bad habits, strengthen internal order, secure their own reputation, they placed all their aims, all their desires in the extinction of this people who in several occasions had rendered them positive services and who in the hours of stress for the stability of these Republics as independent States had not measured the sacrifices to be made.

From long time back the diplomatic re-

representatives of Chile in Peru had invariably observed this morbid sentiment of unjustified rancour, of spontaneous and open ill-will for the men and things of Chile.

A clever Chilean diplomatist Sr. Marcial Martínez, while acting as Minister in Lima, said in 1866—precisely when the relations with Peru were closer and most cordial—that sooner or later there would be an armed rupture with that country.

«Our financial alliance with Peru—said Sr. Martínez with his usual subtlety of observation, in a communication to our Government of January 19th 1866—has many dangers and must be so much more repellent to us as the credit of this country in Europe is worthless. *Chile will have to come armed sooner or later to this Republic* and there is no doubt that if both are tied by a financial transaction, this will be another reason for a war».

Thirteen years later his predictions were fulfilled.

Chile did not have with Peru any boundary questions as both countries had no common frontier; there were in Peruvian territories no Chilean interests opposed to

Peruvian interests. On the contrary the spirit of enterprise and adventure of the Chilean carried to Peru a powerful element of work, activity and impulsion.

But what in the modern spirit of to-day would be a reason for a frank, open, unreserved approachment was for the Peruvians an abundant source of unhealthy inspirations.

There was a fatal march towards a historical moment in which transcendent events for the political life of three brother peoples would happen. This bloody episode has passed to history under the name of «The war of the Pacific» and is for the Chilean arms one of the pages of greatest glory.

CHILEAN-BOLIVIAN BOUNDARY QUESTION

Chile occupied from centuries back the desert and sea-board of Atacama up to the 23 degree of latitude. As it had no acknowledged importance, nobody disputed to Chile the dominion and sovereignty of these territories.

One day great guano deposits are discovered in Peru (1841) and the introduction of this fertilizer in the European markets gave great importance to the discovery, and created for Peru her main and most sure source of revenue.

The Government of Chile ordered the exploration of the Atacama sea board and very soon the enterprising spirit of the Chileans took to those regions men and capitals, giving great impulse to the exploitation of the deposits discovered along the littoral.

The Government of Chile declared by law of 31st. October 1842, that the guano deposits in the sea-board of the Atacama desert and in the islands near the coast are of national property and regulated their production and the export duties on the fertilizer.

Up to that moment the jurisdiction and sovereignty of Chile over those territories is unperturbed and completely quiet.

Then the Government of Bolivia sends as Charge d'Affairs in Chile, Sr. Casimiro Olañeta and the first step of this diplomat is to protest in the name of his Government for the law of 31st October. In his protest Olañeta says only that the Government of Bolivia does not recognize the jurisdiction and sovereignty of Chile over those territories.

The Government of Chile instantly answered stating its titles, declaring its wonder at the Bolivian protest and finishing by leaving settled *without any doubt* the uninterrupted possession and sovereignty of Chile over all the littoral and desert of Atacama up to the 23°.

The Bolivian representative says that he

has no antecedents to maintain a discussion and that he will put the communication of our Foreign Office in the knowledge of his Government and will wait for further instructions. But the Bolivian answer does not come and things go on until 1859, year in which the Government of Bolivia by means of its representative in Santiago Sr. Manuel Salinas, insists anew on the pretensions over the littoral.

Our Foreign Minister answered to the Bolivian representative on July 9th. 1859 with a resume of all the titles and documents serving as foundation to the dominion and sovereignty of Chile on the littoral demonstrating in an irrefutable manner that possession has never been interrupted and always has been accompanied by acts of jurisdiction under the sway of the Spanish Government as well as from the time of our independence.

Before a documentary statement so conclusive of the titles establishing the dominion of Chile over those territories the Government of Bolivia keeps silence again and does not answer.

Three years later Bolivia again insists,

but this time in a very untoward manner. The Chilean citizen Sr. Matías Torres exploiting a guano deposit with Chilean permission to the south of Mejillones and consequently working in Chilean territory, was arrested by Bolivian authorities and his goods put to public auction.

Our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sr. Manuel A. Tocornal, by a communication of 25th. October 1862, protested of that outrage. The Government of Bolivia fully approves the action of the Bolivian authorities of Cobija and gaining extraordinary impetus refuses to recognize not only the dominion but also a fact on which there could be no discussion: the traditional possession of the territory by Chile.

As the statement of our Government dated 9th July 1859 putting forward the complete rights of Chile was still without an answer, our Foreign Minister Sr. Tocornal limited himself now to call the attention of Bolivia to that communication leaving again on record the following facts:

1st. That from the year of 1679 the concessions of lands in the seaboard and

desert of Atacama were asked to the Governor and Captain General of Chile and granted by him;

2d: That from the XVIII century these territories have been ruled by an official with administrative and judicial powers, with the title of «Deputy» and depending from the Governor of Copiapó;

3rd: That with occasion of the foundation of a village in the Paposo towards the end of the XVII century, the authority of Chile had to intervene in this foundation;

4th: That the sovereign will of the King of Spain recognized and approved the jurisdictional acts of Presidents and Captain Generals of Chile in those regions and moreover expressly declared by Royal Orders—transcribed by Minister Soler in 21st June 1803 and Minister Caballero in 3rd. June 1810—that these coasts and territories were of the diocese of Santiago and belonged to Chile;

5th: Finally that Chile has continued in possession by reason of the *uti-possidetis* and possesses them now, as proven by the fact that from 1842 to 1857, the Cus-

tom House of Valparaiso has given permits to load in Mejillones, Angamos, Santa María, Lagartos and other anchorages of the littoral to 113 ships of various nationalities, with full knowledge of Bolivia and without any opposition from her.

About this time Bolivia sent as Charge d'Affairs in Chile Sr. Pascual Soruco (3rd. March 1863). In the first conference with our Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the 13th. April, Sr. Tocornal manifested that he was ready to start the discussion and settlement of the divergencies regarding the limits of both countries to which Sr. Soruco answered that he could not proceed as he was waiting instructions from his Government.

A month later Sr. Soruco was asked anew to start the conferences and the Bolivian representative answered: «I have the regret of stating that the instructions expected from my Government have not arrived and without them it is impossible for me to initiate the discussion of the points referred to. Meanwhile, I must not hide **the sincere satisfaction with which I see the interest of the Cabinet of Santiago to**

settle as soon as possible the disagreeable question interrupting at present the friendly relations between both countries, and have confidence in their high culture to hope that such solutions will be just and reasonable, according to the dignity of two neighbouring and brother States and to the recognized probity and straightforwardness of the Government of Chile (13th May 1863).

What happened meanwhile in Bolivia?

Eight days after having appointed Sr. Soruco as Charge d'affairs the president of the Republic don José María de Acha convoked the national assembly and obtained authorization to declare war on Chile...

This happened the 31st. March and yet on the 13th May the Bolivian representative assured to our Foreign Department that he had not received instructions from his Government.

On getting information of these events through the press the Government of Chile demanded from Sr. Soruco an explicit declaration on the truth of these informations and here is his answer: «Answering

without loss of time I must say that until now I had no official knowledge of the events related and which—the same as the Government of Chile — I have seen published by the press».

At this moment suddenly came the rupture between Peru and Spain followed by the occupation of the Chincha islands by the Spanish fleet, events which we have already told.

The Chilean Nation could not remain indifferent in front of the peril menacing the sovereignty and the existence itself of Peru as an independent State, and in sacrifice towards the cordiality and good harmony so essential at such moments between nations that should make common cause, the Government of Chile under the inspiration of noblest Americanism ceded a great part of her undisputable rights signing the 10th. August 1866 in Santiago with the Bolivian Plenipotentiary Sr. Muñoz Cabrera a treaty that was to put an end to the question separating both countries.

In this treaty it was provided that the products of the deposits and the custom

duties received for the exportation of minerals obtained from the territories between parallels 23 and 25 would be divided by equal shares between both Governments, both Governments to pay half of 80 000 pesos as indemnity to several parties, most of them Chileans, as all the industries established between the 23 and 25 degree were exploited by chilean citizens with chilean capitals.

The frontier line between both Republics was fixed one degree to the south of the Chilean true limit, that is to say at the 24 parallel, Chile ceding in this way to Bolivia one degree of latitude in territory.

Meanwhile industry was developping on the littoral. Two Chilean citizens discovered about that time great deposits of nitrate of soda and borax to the south of 23rd degree, and almost simultaneously another Chilean discovered the rich mines of «Caracoles» giving great impulse and considerable commercial importance to that region.

This unexpected prosperity of the littoral was, unfortunately, to have a perturbing

influence in the international policy of our northern neighbours.

Six years had elapsed since the signature of the Treaty of 1866 and the Government of Bolivia had not fulfilled yet several of its provisions, among which that of delivering to Chile one half of the taxes perceived in the mediating zone.

To solve the difficulties presented in the practice by the Treaty, the 5th December 1872 an agreement was celebrated between the Chilean Charge d'Affairs Sr. Santiago Lindsay and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia Sr. Casimiro Corral, establishing an acceptable *modus vivendi* while a definite settlement was obtained.

LINDSAY-CORRAL CONVENTION

Although this convention did not cause a good impression in Chile it was approved by the Government, whereas the Congress of Bolivia in its session of May 19th 1873 resolved to postpone its consideration for the next year.

The influences of the Government of Peru, tied to Bolivia from three months back by the Secret Treaty, disturbed all satisfactory arrangements between Chile and Bolivia.

TREATY OF 1874

New negotiations were started reaching at last to the conclusion of the Treaty of 1874 by which the halving system—cause of many disagreements—was suppressed with the exception of the exploitation of guano.

Although this treaty considerably bettered the conditions established for Bolivia by the Treaty of 1866, it met with strong opposition as it went against the plans of the Government of Peru, for some reason leagued with Bolivia by the Secret Treaty.

Nevertheless after a hard fought struggle the Treaty passed.

Chile abandoned in favour of Bolivia all the advantages obtained by the Treaty of 1866, to wit: renouncement of the faculty of supervising the custom offices of the

mediating zone, cancelled the debt of Bolivia for the duties perceived since the Treaty was signed, giving to her the exclusive perception in future, and in a word suspended all the restrictions that the Treaty of 1866 put over the Bolivian dominion on territories between parallels 23 and 24.

As compensation Chile asked only a guarantee for the persons, industries and capitals of Chileans that were impulsing the progress and to which the prosperity of that region was due.

The article 4th of the new treaty provided that «The duties of exportacion to be imposed on the minerals exploited in the zone of territories referred above (parallels 23 to 24) **will not exceed the quota at present fixed; and the persons, industries and capitals of Chileans will not be subjected to any other contributions, of any class whatsoever, than those at present existing.** The stipulation contained in this clause **will last for a term of 25 years**».

VIOLATION OF THE TREATY OF 1874

Barely five years after the enactment of this treaty the Congress of Bolivia passed a law fixing a duty of ten cents as a minimum, per quintalion exported nitrate, action that constituted an open and flagrant violation of the Treaty.

The Legation of Chile immediately represented to the Government of Bolivia the gravity of this resolution and obtained from the Finance Minister Sr. Medina the assurance that the law, that he himself found inconvenient, would be suspended until a correct and prudent solution of the difficulty was found.

The Minister of Chile in his communication to the Foreign Minister of Bolivia called his attention to a decisive precedent which manifested the opinion of the Government of Bolivia on the practical appli-

cation of the treaty. Our Minister said in this communication, **which was answered five months later:**

«The Municipality of Antofagasta, by communication of 4th March 1875 asked from the President of the Council of State of Bolivia that a municipal tax of 3 cents per quintal of nitrate exported be imposed to the Nitrate Company, as the Government had declared that the Company was not exempt from municipal duties. This petition was sent to the Departmental Council of Cobija. **The council informed that the petition should be refused**, because it went against the art. 4th of the agreement celebrated between the Government and the Company the 27th November 1873 **and also because there exists a Treaty of limits with Chile that is valid and according to which, no new duties can be imposed in the littoral».**

In view of this report and the reasons aduced, the 27th August 1875 a decree was issued in Sucre declaring that the contribution intended was illegal.

As soon after this the Government of Chile was informed that the Government of

Bolivia persisted anew in imposing the new tax—against the promise made by the Finance Minister to the Chilean representative that the law would be suspended until a solution was found—the following instructions were sent to our Legation:

«It is then necessary, to avoid serious conflicts, that you inform to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the present communication giving him a copy of it if convenient, and express that our Government does not for a moment believe that that of Bolivia will persist in the application of a tax as the one in question, because it is openly contrary to the text and spirit of the pact of August 6th 1874.

«Equally contrary to that pact are the augmentations of contributions known as «additional duties» perceived by the Lighterage company; the onerous modifications of the tax of ballast in favour of the Municipality, etc.

«My Government, by the expressed considerations, cannot look indifferently on these transgressions of the pact of 1874 and considers convenient that you ask the

Government of Bolivia the definite suspension of all contributions posterior to the validity of the Treaty, as well as of all onerous modifications introduced in contributions existing before that. **The refusal of the Government of Bolivia to a demand as just as evident, would place my Government in the case of declaring the nullity of the Treaty of limits** with that country and the consequences of this painful declaration, absolutely justified and necessary, would be **of the exclusive responsibility of the side that has left without fulfillment what has been agreed».**

The 28th November a conference took place between the Chilean Minister Sr. Pedro N. Videla and the Cabinet and the Minister declared to the Chilean representative, that after consulting the President of the Republic **it had been decided in Cabinet council to apply immediately the tax.** Sr. Videla made present his wonder before such decision which he considered against the promise made by the Finance Minister and against the most elemental principles of International Law

and the courtesy with which Chile, a friendly country, had a right to be treated by Bolivia **since until that date he had not received an answer to the communication in which, five months before, he had expressed the reasons forbidding Chile to accept the contribution fixed.**

As the Cabinet insisted in making the tax immediately effective, Videla read the communication received from Santiago and expressed that if the decision was insisted upon, the Government of Chile would believe that they gave the Treaty of 1873 as broken and would take on its part the necessary measures to meet the new situation which, against its desires, was created.

Before the gravity of the situation to be created, the Ministers declared they would consult again with the President and as Videla manifested the necessity of a decisive answer before the dispatch of the post—for which a few hours only remained—the conference was suspended.

One hour after the Legation received the visit of the Subsecretary of Foreign Affairs, who communicated to Videla that it had been resolved to suspend all measures

until Videla received the answer to his communication of July 2d.

A few days after—13th December—the Legation received a communication from the Foreign Minister, presenting a report of the Finance Minister on the Chilean reclamation and stating that the Government of Bolivia in view of the reasons adduced in this report, thought its duty to order the observance of the law imposing a new tax on the Nitrate Company.

Videla asked if time would be given before applying the law, for the Government of Chile to have knowledge of the communication just delivered and he got as an answer on the 18th December **that the order to apply the law was already sent.**

Effectively, the 6th January 1879 the Governor of Antofagasta compulsorily demanded from the Nitrate Company the payment of the tax from the 14th February 1878, date of the decision of the Bolivian Assembly, and as he did not obtain payment ordered the embargo of the properties of the Company and the arrest of the manager Sr. Jorge Hicks.

PROPOSALS OF ARBITRATION

A last effort was made to submit the question to arbitration, as provided in the same Treaty, but the Government of Bolivia fixed as previous condition that the law be applied before the initiation of the arbitrating process and the Government of Chile demanded the suspension of the law while the arbitration lasted.

«My Government, said on this occasion the Minister of Chile, wishes me to express that accepting the indication made to me, **it is disposed to continue the discussion** interrupted by the order of applying the law of 14th February, and **to constitute arbitration** in case of a direct settlement being impossible.

«But my Government acts in this way persuaded that yours has the purpose on its side of giving immediate orders for the sus-

pension of the application of the law and that things will be replaced in the state they were before the decree of 18th. December, as this is the logical consequence of the proposition of arbitration. Bolivia has gone against the provisions of the treaty of 1874, reforming in 1878 the tributary system existing in the littoral at the date of that pact; consequently the suspension of the decree ordering the application of the new tax is an essential and previous condition to resume discussion and start the steps to constitute the arbitrating court.

«But this uncertain situation, full of dangers cannot be prolonged further without causing considerable damage to both countries; such uncertainty must disappear as soon as possible and for this it is necessary that the Government of Bolivia makes its decision known without delays. I beg, then that whatever be the definite decision taken by your Government in view of the present communication, you will please put it in my knowledge before the 23rd instant; because on that date I must transmit it to my Government which with so much interest expects the solution of this question».

The Government of Bolivia left this communication without any answer.

As already said, the Governor of Antofagasta, following the instructions received from the Government of Bolivia, had ordered seizure of the properties of the Nitrate Company and notified that on the 14th. February its valuable properties would be sold by public auction.

The Company stopped work leaving idle 2 000 men.

THE PROPERTIES OF THE CHILEAN NITRATE COMPANY ARE CONFIS- CATED.

The 1st. of February 1879, the Govern-
ment of Bolivia issued a decree **confiscating**
all the properties of the Nitrate Com-
pany.

President Daza wrote on this matter to
the Governor of Antofagasta a letter in
which, among other things he said.

«I have good news for you. *I have bursted
the gringos* (vulgar name applied to foreig-
ners and specially to the english and in this ca-
se to Mr. Hicks) decreeing the reivindication
of the nitrate fields and they will not be
able to recover them even if the whole
world tries it. I hope Chile will not mix
in this affair. . . but if she declares war we
may count on the support of Peru to which
we will demand the fulfillment of the Se-

cret Treaty. With this object I am sending Reyes Ortiz to Lima. You see how I give you good news that you must eternally appreciate and as I say gringos are completely stuck and the Chileans are forced to rage and protest only».

The diplomatic controversy degenerated into acts of violence.

Unknowing what happened at La Paz, on account of the difficulty of communications at that time, the Government of Chile gave instructions to Videla the 5th February, in the following terms:

«**Guided by a sincere spirit of conciliation** and taking into account that Bolivia is relatively a weak country, we believe that if the tax is suspended **we could open and continue the discussion interrupted by that Government** and reach by your influence **a friendly agreement** and if this is not possible, **to constitute arbitration in conformity with the protocol annexed to the pact.** In this way we will eloquently manifest that Chile—**whenever dignity permits—prefers pacific solutions and is disposed to fulfill**

with noble loyalty her international obligations.

«It is convenient that you fully comprehend the aims of my Government so that if that of Bolivia wishes to retrace its steps and straightly fulfill the obligations of the pact of 1874 you can facilitate in an honorable and satisfactory manner the road which may take to such happy result».

When Videla was notified of the decree confiscating the properties of the Chilean Company, he addressed the 8th February an ultimatum to the Government of Bolivia, asking to be informed within 48 hours if Bolivia accepted to submit to arbitration the solution of the conflict in the manner proposed by Chile, that is to say suspending the application of the law.

As he did not receive any answer Videla asked his passports on the 12th February and gave his mission as finished, with the following communication to the Foreign Minister of Bolivia:

La Paz, February 12th 1879. Sir: The Saturday 8th instant, at 6 P. M., I had delivered to the Chief Official of the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, a note asking that in the peremptory term of 48 hours you definitely answered me if your Government accepted or not the arbitration established in the Treaty of 1874.

«Until to-day, Wednesday at 1 P. M. the term fixed has elapsed with excess and yet I have had not the honour of receiving an answer from you. This silence is equivalent to a refusal that renders completely useless and void the permanency of this Legation near the Government of Bolivia.

«Accordingly and in conformity with the instructions of my Government received by me, I have decided to return to Chile and take the liberty of requesting from you that the necessary passports be expedited.

«**Before retiring and for a better intelligence of what may occur I must declare that this rupture is exclusively the work of your Government which having proposed twice the arbitration established in the Treaty has forgotten these proposals, after having been ac-**

cepted by my Government, with its recognized loyalty.

«The Treaty of 6th. August 1874 being broken by reason of Bolivia not fulfilling the obligations stipulated in it, **the rights that Chile legitimately supported before the Treaty of 1866 are reborn** over the territories to which this Treaty refers.

«Consequently, the Government of Chile will exert all such acts that it may consider necessary for the defense of such rights and the Government of Bolivia cannot see in them but the logical sequence of the rupture it has provoked and of **her reiterated refusal to search for a just solution** that would have been equally honourable to both countries.

«With sentiments of consideration and respect I sign myself yours faithfully.
(signed) *P. N. Videla* To His Excellency Sr. don Eulogio D. Medina, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia».

OCCUPATION OF ANTOFAGASTA

The Government of Chile ordered on the 14th February the occupation of the port of Antofagasta and in general **all the territories that she possessed before celebrating with Bolivia the Treaties this country had just broken.**

On this, the Foreign Minister of Chile, Sr. Fierro, in a circular to the Diplomatic Corps in Santiago, said the following:

«The occupation that took place on the 14th February, **can never be taken as a declaration of war, and less as a manifestation of my Government menacing the sovereignty of Bolivia.** With less reason can it be believed that the Cabinet of Santiago wished to alter the geographical limits of neighbouring nations. **In this conflict, which would never have occurred if the least appearance of respect**

had been manifested to the text and spirit of Treaties, what the Republic has pretended from the start with the most open clearness, has been to defend her affected national rights, and the outraged private property. *Before 1866 we had effective possession up to parallel 23; by the Treaty of that year we accepted the promiscuous exploitation to parallel 25; and later we fixed the limit of Chile on the parallel 24, if the neighbouring Republic freed our industry of all new exactions.*

«The situation of both Republics seemed clear enough. Chile renounced to her effective dominion up to parallel 23; Bolivia ceded her phantastic expectations to parallel 24; and both countries, respecting the fact that *Antofagasta, Mejillones, Caracoles and Salinas* were created by Chile, pledged themselves to guarantee the liberty of the industries established in those regions. This unquestionably **demand**ed from Chile an immense sacrifice as she ceded to Bolivia not only questionable territories, but also much on which it would have been impossible to dispute her dominion.

«The precedents of the Treaty of 1866 and the negotiations that gave as result the pact of 1874, are the most evident proof that Chile, *far from desiring the increase of her limits recognized under the colonial dominion, only looked for an agreement allowing the unrestricted exercise of Chilean labour, without taking into consideration that Bolivia gained territories that were under our possession*».

THE MEDIATION OF PERU (1879)

Diplomatic relations with Bolivia once broken, Peru her ally, considered that the time had come for offering her mediation.

Under date of the 14th February our Minister in Bolivia said in his last communication to the Foreign Department of Chile:

«At the time of closing this communication I have received the visit of Sr. Quiñones, Minister of Peru. *Sr. Quiñones has told me not only that he means to offer officially the mediation of his Government, but he has also assured me* **that there is no intention on its part of taking side in favour of Bolivia in her present conflict with Chile.** I immediately communicate this important declaration to you being authorized to it by Sr. Quiñones».

Sr. Quiñones reporting to his Government

on his steps of mediation, says as follows in a communication dated 15th. February, 1879.

«By several members of the Government and authorized persons, and especially by Sr. Doria Medina, I know that H. E. general Daza and his Cabinet **are decided not to cede one point in the trend they have given to the question**, even in case that Chile occupies by force all the littoral of this Republic; **because they wish to profit by Chile declaring broken the Treaties and replace the things as they were before 1866 to obtain by Diplomatic means or by force a Treaty that will consult the sovereignty and rights of Bolivia over the littoral, sovereignty and rights that are a sarcasm under the Treaties of 1866 and 1874; counting for this with the justice of their cause and with the loyalty of the Government of Peru in the fulfillment of the secret pact of alliance of February 6th 1873.**

«On the part of the Chilean Government it can be assured also that there is the decision of carrying things to the last extremity

because *having put myself in contact with Hon. Leonel de Alencar, Minister of Brasil, with the object of agreeing to interpose a mediation, jointly or separately*, in the name of our respective Governments, I have been able to gather from him—who has intimate relations with Hon. Sr. Videla, that the Legation of Chile acts attenuating as far as possible the energetic and final instructions of his Government to direct the question to a rupture; and I must add that the same has been told me by Sr. Videla, with exception of the last part, doubtless because he could not and should not manifest but the good disposition of his Government to employ all conciliatory means to avoid a conflict.

«Under such circumstances, you will understand that I could not wait the solicitation of mediation on the part of this Government, but taking advantage of the insinuation that I could suppose as suggested by the Chilean Foreign Department, by reason of the intimate relations of both diplomacies and by steps of a private character, I fulfilled the instructions received presenting in the most opportune moment

the mediation of Peru, because I think that no better opportunity could present itself than in the moment of a rupture with the petition of passports.

«I called yesterday on the Foreign Minister and expressed to Sr. Doria Medina that my object was to interpose, as in fact I did formally interpose, the good offices and mediation of Peru in the conflict unhappily occurring between Bolivia and Chile, so that by means of frank and friendly explanations or accepting any means they allowed me to suggest we might dispel the conflict. H. E. the Minister, informed privately beforehand of my steps as to this mediation, officially answered: *that his Government knew with satisfaction the sincerity of my proceeding and that while greatly appreciating the attitude of Peru, reserves its answer accepting or refusing until the arrival of the next foreign mail via Tacna; adding under reserve, that probably the answer would be the latter*: 1st. because the Government had information to believe that at that time Chile had already entered in the field of acts, taking possession of Antofagasta and

committing other acts of hostility with the forces she had concentrated in that port, in which case the mediation would be useless, 2nd. **Because they wanted to know the result of the special mission in which had been sent the Minister Sr. Reyes Ortiz to our Government;** and 3rd. because H. E. the President of the Republic and his Cabinet were decided *not to cede one point in the line of conduct that they have fixed, until they obtain complete justice from Chile.*

«H. E. the Minister also insinuated that the Legation of Brasil was disposed to offer the mediation of its Government, jointly or separately from Peru, and he told me under reserve **that Hon. Sr. de Alencar nor his Government inspired confidence to Bolivia has almost certain information was to hand that there was a secret pact of alliance between Chile and Brasil.**

«I called immediately afterwards on Sr. Alencar to whom I only expressed about the mediation that Sr. Doria Medina had offered an answer after the arrival of the next mail via Tacna.

«Yesterday, very early I went to the Legation of Chile and formally presented the offer of mediation of Peru, in the same terms as to H. E. Sr. Doria Medina and Hon. Sr. Videla speaking in a cordial and frank manner told me that *he was ready and that he esteemed and thanked the mediation just offered, because the rumour, acceptable only to common people, was circulating that Peru was going to enter in the question in favour of Bolivia and even that she had sent two warships to Antofagasta to oppose the hostilities of his Government; hostilities that could not take place, because the ironclad Blanco Encalada, being under his orders, he had given orders to his commander to observe the most peaceful attitude, although he knew that the authorities of Antofagasta were committing all kinds of outrages against the Nitrate Company and the Chilean collectivity.* Finally he expressed that he would like the mediation to be of immediate effect, because he could not be answerable for any violent measures adopted by his Government in view of any conflict that could crop up in Antofagasta».

Seven days after—the 22nd. February, the Peruvian Minister reported on the failure of his negotiations in the following communication:

«In my first reserved N.º 21 of 15th. inst. I informed you that I had offered mediation to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia who delayed his answer until the arrival of the next foreign mail via Tacna, that is to say the 18th.

«**As I did not receive any answer,** I called on the Minister, who told me we could have a conference the 22nd. to consider the means of reaching a satisfactory solution for both Republics.

«The Minister of Brasil also visited Sr. Doria Medina and obtained from him the promise of treating the question on the 22nd, after which Sr. de Alencar visited me and after a long conference, we decided to have the same night a reunion with the Chilean Charge d’Affairs to tell him what we had arranged with Sr. Doria Medina.

«As arranged I went at 7 P. M. to the residence of Sr. Videla but unfortunately he was absent. On the 20 th. Sr. de Alencar agreed to meet me at this Legation at 1 P. M.

to prepare a written joint proposal of mediation to the Government of Bolivia and to the Chilean Chargé d’Affairs. In view that at 2 P. M. the Minister of Brazil had not come I sent the Secretary Sr. Blanco to obtain an answer. **Sr. Alencar manifested that he had abandoned this question in view of the dilations offered by the Government of Bolivia;** that he thought extremely difficult to reach a satisfactory solution, because on the 22nd—day fixed for the conference by Sr. Doria Medina—Sr. Videla was retiring from La Paz and as the Chilean Minister had lost his public character with the delivery of his passports, the negotiations to be initiated would have to be *ad referendum* which was another obstacle to the success of the mediation».

.....
Further on he says referring to his interview with Videla:

«The Hon. Sr. Videla finished saying that before I had taken any steps **he had exhausted all the conciliatory means that suggested his patriotism and the wish to keep the good relations with**

Bolivia, not only in his diplomatic character, but also as a private individual, and that therefore he was convinced that the conferences would be useless, saying moreover that if I had found such good disposition from the Government of general Daza it was easy that the negotiation be carried on between the Foreign Ministers, because he could not go against the order of retiring he had received. I asked him then if he believed that there was nothing that could be done and he answered affirmatively. Then I told him that I would report all the incidencies to you to the end of leaving permanent record of the good will of the Government of my country to obtain that two sister Republics settle their divergencies by peaceful and conciliatory means».

THE LAVALLE MISSION

Events precipitated themselves and the Peruvian Government saw itself caught in its own net. It needed to gain time to finish its military preparations, but if the war was declared by Bolivia it would be placed in front of this dilemma: to declare the neutrality of Peru or to reveal the existence of the Secret Treaty.

With the object of retarding things as much as possible it sent to Chile Sr. José Antonio de Lavalle as Extraordinary representative with the mission of offering the mediation of Peru.

Few days after his arrival to Santiago, Sr. Lavalle sent to his Government, the following note:

«Peruvian Legation in Chile—Santiago, March 7th 1879.

«Sir: In this country there is general

talk about the existence of a secret Treaty between the Republic of Peru and Bolivia. This general and deep rooted belief is the cause of the exasperation of passions against us, lately manifested with such intensity; because they suppose treason on our part to present ourselves as mediators between Bolivia and Chile, when we are pledged to follow the first in her hostilities against the second.

«To all persons—and they are not few nor of the least prominent—that have talked with me on this point, I have limited myself to assure that such pact has not been submitted to the approval of the Government of Peru in none of the Legislatures corresponding to the years 1874, 76 and 78, in which I have had the honour of presiding the Diplomatic Committee of the Congress—a fact that is true—indicating that mayhap the character of secret pact of alliance is given to certain convention on transportation of troops celebrated as I remember in 1874 between Peru and Bolivia.

«But, night before last, in a long talk

I had with my excellent friend Sr. Domingo Santa María, person of great prominence in this country, he said that he expected that the Government of Chile, previous to any discussion, would demand a final and explicit explanation on the existence of the pact referred to, from which explanation it was probable would depend the continuation or rupture of all negotiations.

«The case has not yet arrived and if it occurs before I receive your instructions, **I will limit myself to answer that not having knowledge of such convention I will ask from you the information and corresponding instructions.**

«I beg that you send these as soon as possible to suit my action extrictly to them, advising you in the meanwhile that the suspicion of the existence of this convention is the main cause of the prevention wich which is looked here the friendly participation of Peru in the Chilean-Bolivian question.

«Waiting for a quick and precise answer on this, etc....(Signed).—*J. A. Lavalle*».

INTERVIEW OF LAVALLE WITH PRESIDENT PINTO

Under date of March 11th. Sr. Lavalle reported on his interview with the President of the Chilean Republic, in the following terms:

«As I had the honour of informing you by the communication written early to-day, at mid-day I had to have a conference with H. E. the President and another at 2 P. M. with the Foreign Minister: the first arranged by the President himself and the second asked by me.

«Consequently at mid-day I went to the private apartment of H. E. who deigned to receive me with the most open and simple cordiality, expressing that he wished me to treat him as a friend and that as such he wanted to see me, so as to exchange with all frankness our ideas on the situation

of our respective countries; that he and the country he governed had no prevention against Peru and far less for her Government; that on the contrary all his desires were to maintain the best harmony with Peru and strengthen more and more the relations with her; that he was sure that the same sentiments were held by the Government of H. E. general Prado and the Peruvian nation, my presence in Santiago being proof of this, as well for the mission of which I was charged as for Peru having selected a person inspiring such good affect in the society of Santiago; but as the situation of relations with Bolivia was at the moment so difficult—a fact that could not but react in the relations with Peru—it was necessary to solve this situation to consolidate the relations that should permanently unite Chile to Peru; and that it was urgent to solve it soon to avoid that its continuation, exciting passions and agitated sentiments, gave place to new complications; that I must have observed in Santiago as well as in Valparaiso that the true and genuine expression of public sentiment was not the

one expressed in certain demonstrations and by means of certain newspapers; that Sr. Godoy had informed that the same was happening in Lima and that under such conviction we must exchange ideas in an entirely reserved and confidential manner; that he supposed that as there was no time for the Government of Peru to have made any agreement with that of Bolivia, after the occupation of Antofagasta, I could not bring from the part of the Government of Peru any final proposals, which being already accepted by Bolivia could serve as basis for a negotiation».

Further on Sr. Lavalle in the same communication says:

«I brought him again to the question of retiring from the littoral and H. E. said: *What is your idea to clear this difficulty?*».

«I had reason to suppose that the cause of the call of the President was to look for means conducive to this end, and expressed that without instructions from my Government for it and without authority to propose anything and far less to sign, and reserving always

the need of asking special approbation from the Peruvian Government for everything, with the most keen interest of reaching a peaceful and honourable solution of this intricate difficulty, thought that there was no obstacle for Chile and Bolivia adopting the following conclusions:

«1st.: Chile to evacuate the Boliyan littoral, declaring that territory isolated until an arbitrator decides to whom belongs its real dominion;

2nd.: Constitution in the territory of an autonomous municipal administration, formed by persons elected in the manner provided by an especial pact, under the protectorate and guarantee of Chile, Bolivia and Peru who would agree on the manner of exerting that protectorate in an efficient form;

«3rd.: That the fiscal production of the territory be applied to the necessities of its administration, and the excess, if any, to be distributed between Chile and Bolivia.

«H. E. heard my proposal with the utmost attention and when I finished objected in detail the first point, first under its theoretical aspect and then under its

practical application. As to the first he said that **Chile had not occupied nor did occupy Bolivian territory**, as in such case there would be no difficulty in abandoning it, because he would understand the just susceptibility of Bolivia on treating while the flag of Chile waved there, although he repeated that thousands of times nations far more powerful had treated even with their capitals occupied; **that what Chile occupied was a territory considered her own, to which she had always maintained her right and exerted jurisdiction; territory ceded to Bolivia in 1866 under certain conditions that not being fulfilled by Bolivia had forced Chile, to preserve peace, to substitute for other conditions easier to comply and more generous, in 1874;** that Bolivia had not complied with these, but on the contrary had openly violated them, and hence Chile reinvoked her ceded rights and went back to the position she had in 1866; that as service to peace, in consideration of the good offices of Peru and in the just desire that the possession she now had was sanctioned by the recognition of her rights

and not by an armed solution, Chile would submit to a decision; if this was adverse—thing that he did not suppose so—she would retire delivering the territories to the one declared with right to them; **that Chile did not pretend conquest of territories**, having enough, **but to recuperate her own**, and not only for reason of being true Chilean territories, but also because they were mainly populated by Chileans; that Bolivia had no interest in them, not being able to administer them due to the great distance of her administrative centers and that if Bolivia wished she could make agreements with Chile, through Peru, without arbitration by means of equitable indemnizations.

«As to the practical aspect of the proposal, H. E. said that all Governments had to count with public opinion, even when exaggerated and passionate, and this more so with representative Governments in general and those of the American Republics in particular; and that in the situation in which Chile was, the retirement of the Chilean troops in the littoral would create complications, instead of facilitating a so-

lution and would originate mayhap new and far greater difficulties.

«I opposed in detail the arguments of H. E. in the first part of his reasoning and passing to the second, that is to say practical aspect, I expressed that the Government of Bolivia had—and mayhap more than that of Chile—to count on public opinion; that Bolivia must be greatly agitated by the last events and that she would not allow general Daza, even if he so wished, to treat under the pressure of the occupation of the littoral.

«Leaving the discussion there, the President observed that the 3rd. point of distribution of the revenues during the arbitration did not appear convenient to him. I agreed on this and suggested that the revenues could be deposited with the arbitrator until the question was decided, which he accepted under condition that the 1st. point was acceptable.

«As it was near 2 P. M., hour fixed for my interview with Sr. Fierro, I told so to the President who said that I could speak with confidence with the Minister and that he, in the meanwhile, would think on

what we had talked and would consult his Ministers and other persons; with this our conference ended, with a renewal of the greatest protestations of good will on both sides.

«Before going I asked the President if I could telegraph to Lima saying that negotiations had a satisfactory aspect. He answered that such assertion could originate greater hopes of agreement than there were in reality, and that I should limit myself to say what was true, that I had found the best good will on the part of his Government to reach a peaceful settlement.

«I went then to the office of Sr. Fierro, and my conference with him, full of cordiality and courtesy, was naturally a second edition of the one had with the President. Sr. Fierro agreed that he would consider my project and consult it with his colleagues, offering to have another conference when the time came. Before separating we agreed that our conversations had a purely confidential character; that no official character would be given to them until something was agreed to;

and that, if such case did not arrive we would try to put an end to the negotiation, by mutual accord, so as to give to it the least offensive character possible.

At the moment of going Sr. Fierro asked leave to ask what was effective as to the secret Treaty between Peru and Bolivia, which Godoy wrote existed since 1873; he said he wondered why Godoy in 6 years had said no word about it and how a treaty, supposed to have been approved by the Congresses of Peru and Bolivia, could have remained secret so many years; that Videla had assured him that he never had heard anything about it in Bolivia until lately, when it had been said that in a book-case a secret treaty between Peru and Bolivia had been found; that he had been told that the action of the Argentine Republic in favour of this treaty had been worked for, but that the Chamber of Deputies had rejected it at the petition of Rawson.

«I answered that I had been Chairman of the Diplomatic commission of Congress during the Legislatures of 1874, 76 and 78 and that I had not seen

the Treaty during them; but that as I heard so much said in Chile about the Treaty, I had asked information from Lima regarding it.

«This is all that happened in my conferences with H. E. and his Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 11th. inst. The results of them I will report to you successively and opportunely. Meanwhile.. (Signed).—*José Antonio Lavalle*».

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sr. Fierro says in his statement to friendly nations, about the Peruvian mediation, the following:

«When the Gabinet of La Paz showed itself deaf to any observation; when as only argument opposed to us decrees against the Treaty of 1874; when to peaceful indications it was answered with the application of the law of 1878 that implicitly abrogated her recent pledges with Chile; then the mediation would have been practicable, if Peru had the true character of an honest common friend.

«Firmly believing for the moment that the mediation had no basis, my Govern-

ment judged that this opinion was not opposed to hear the expression of the thoughts of the Peruvian Government, that its representative Sr. José Antonio de Lavalle was going to transmit. In the preliminary conference of March 11th. between the undersigned and Sr. Lavalle it was established that its object was to exchange ideas and make general appreciations of the Chilean-Bolivian question. As in those days the presumption of the existence of a secret treaty of alliance between Peru and Bolivia, adjusted in the year 73, was gaining strength, it seemed necessary to interrogate the Peruvian Envoy on a fact of such gravity; **and as at the same time an untoward movement was observed of the army and navy of Peru, explanations were asked on the significance and scope of such preparations.**

«Sr. Lavalle gave the following answer:

«That he had no knowledge of the treaty referred to, that he believed it did not exist and that it could not have been approved by the Congress of 1873, because the legislature assembled only every second year until the constitutional reform of 1878,

and Congress had no sessions that year; and that he was sure it could not have been approved in the succeeding years during which he had the honour of presiding the Diplomatic Commission of the Congress, before which that transaction must have been debated; that, nevertheless, as since his arrival to Chile he had heard talk about the existence of such pact, he had asked information from his Government, which he would make a duty of communicating as soon as received.

«As to the bellic attitude that Peru started to show, her representative said that he attributed it to the special situation of her territory and the necessity of avoiding its violation by the operations of the belligerents, a thing rational to foresee as the Bolivian armies had invaded it even in cases of internal revolt».

As the Government of Chile did not find these explanations very satisfactory, it sent instructions to our Minister in Lima, to put in clear the equivocal situation of that Government, asking for a quick declaration of neutrality.

The Peruvian Government excused such

declaration, alleging that as yet the state of war with Bolivia was not declared...

On March 14th. our Minister in Lima advised our Government that the Bolivian Chargé d'Affairs had notified the Diplomatic Corps resident there, the declaration of war to Chile and on the same day Godoy received orders to obtain from the Peruvian Government an explicit declaration of neutrality.

Four days after the Peruvian Government answered referring itself to instructions to be sent to its Extraordinary Envoy in Chile..

In view of this new evasive, the Minister in Lima was ordered to demand from the Peruvian Government a final declaration on the existence of the Secret Treaty, denied by its representative in Chile, and the suspension of armaments.

PRESIDENT PRADO ACKNOWLEDGES THE EXISTENCE OF THE SECRET TREATY

Cornered by Godoy in a form precluding all evasives, President Prado confirmed the existence of the Secret Treaty and expressed to the Minister of Chile, that in consequence he could not declare the neutrality of Peru.

When the Government of Chile knew the declaration of President Prado, it ordered Godoy to ask for his passports, sending them at the same time to Sr. Lavalle with the following communication:

«Santiago, April 2nd. 1879.—Sir: The declaration made in these last days to the Chilean Minister in Lima by your Government, that it could not declare itself neutral in our conflict with Bolivia, by reason of having a pact of defensive alliance,

read by you in the conference we had the 31st. ult., has made my Government understand that it is impossible to maintain friendly relations with Peru.

«In the first conference we had the 11th. March ult. answering to the interrogation made by me as to the existence of this pact, you assured me that you did not know of it, that you did not believe it existed and that such alleged convention could not have been approved by the Peruvian Congress in 1873—in which year it was said it was adjusted—and far less in the succeeding years in which you formed part of the Diplomatic Commission. Standing by that answer my Government sees that yours on reserving the pact from you and from this Government has placed itself in a profoundly irregular position.

«My Government has been surprised to know that Peru projected and signed this pact at the time in which it manifested towards Chile sentiments of cordial friendship.

«To this misterious act for which the strictest reserve was agreed, the Government of Chile answers with the highest

frankness declaring broken the relations with the Government of Peru and considers it as belligerent by virtue of the authorization to this end and dated to-day, received from the high powers of State.

«On sending your passports it is my duty to assure you that the necessary orders have been given so that your return and that of the permanent Legation of Peru are attended with all the facilities and considerations which are due.

«With sentiments of the highest consideration, etc...»

We reproduce next the brilliant diplomatic document in which Godoy, giving his mission as finished, declares broken the relations with the Government of Peru and asks for his passports:

«Legation of Chile in Peru.—Lima, April 3rd. 1879.—Sir: The undersigned, Extraordinary Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary of Chile, following instructions from his Government, has the honour of expressing to H. E. the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, the serious motives that have made disappear the harmony existing until now between both Republics, and

that mean an unavoidable rupture of the good relations maintained for so many years between both. You will find also the only resource to which—although extremely regrettable—the undersigned has to appeal, in view that the legitimate demands of the Government of Chile have been unconsidered by that of Peru.

«On the breaking out of the conflict—that without provocation of the Government of the undersigned and quite against its wishes—has interrupted the friendly relations uniting Chile with Bolivia and placed both nations in state of war, the most perfect harmony reigned between Chile and Peru. The friendship of these two States, tightened since their first days of existence, had been imperturbably maintained and had been fortified with the passing of time, under the influence of their mutual interests and conveniences of all orders and with the succession of repeated events in which noble and common aspirations had called them to unite their efforts as allies, events in which Chile always had occasion to give unmistakable

proofs of the generosity and sincerity of her sentiments.

«In such situation, it was natural to hope that the cause of Chile in the conflict alluded to—cause on which side are reason and justice, civilization and good faith—would have found in the people and Government of Peru noble adhesions and strong sympathies; and if considerations and aims in divergency could have made one or the other people to forget for one instant the rights of an old friendship and even their real and permanent interests, it was, at the least, to be hoped that Peru—submitting to the most clear and imperious duties to which nations are subject, getting inspiration from them, respecting the sacred obligations enforced by reciprocity, by mutual respect and by those same common interests of the American family to which a name has been given that is more used than understood,—**would have kept a severe and strict neutrality, such neutrality at least as was indispensable to adopt to exert, as she has tried, the delicate office of mediator; that is to say, to be the depositor of**

the confidence of the contending nations.

«Hence it is impossible to state the sentiment of wonder and surprise with which the Government of Chile and the whole nation have taken notice of the attitude assumed by Peru.

«This attitude is clearly revealed by facts as notorious as repeated.

«The undersigned will not consider, but to mention them, the popular meetings in several towns of the Republic, expressly consented by the authorities, to publicly proclaim the union to Bolivia and the war to Chile.

«He will not place either among the most grave facts **the daily and general clamour of the press, which in passionate and sometimes insulting language asks the rupture with Chile and the common cause with Bolivia as the aspiration and the fondest purpose of this country.**

«He will fix only his attention in acts of the most serious character to be imputed to the Government of Peru.

«No precaution has been enough to occult

longer the existence of the Secret Treaty of Alliance that in 1873 adjusted Bolivia and Peru. According to that pact **adjusted when Chile rested in the security that a perfect peace reigned in the relations with this country, with Bolivia and with all nations**, Peru remained **formally pledged to constitute herself**, in the case of a conflict like the present, in enemy of Chile and to engage to her damage, her armies and treasury.

«There is not only that obligation provided in the secret pact of 1873. The Government of the undersigned knows that yours has begun to fulfill it **directly, although secretly, proportioning to that of Bolivia arms and war_ammunitions.**

«Chile, deeply offended by the attitude of Peru, as revealed in these two concrete facts, could have refused to recognize the neutral character that this nation pretends to keep and treat her as an enemy. Such conduct would have had, as in reality has, the most clear sanction in International Law. She did not act with the rigour she had a right to; **she tried to avoid the war with a people whose friendship has never been indifferent to her.** She li-

mitted herself to send instructions to her representative near the Peruvian Government to **invite it to explain with loyalty the real aim of her military preparations**, to manifest the nature and scope of the secret treaty of alliance adjusted with Bolivia and to make a formal declaration of its purpose. Such was the intention of the communication that the undersigned had the honour of addressing to you on the 17th March, the same that took him nine days afterwards to confer with H. E. the President and with you. You know that the undersigned had not the fortune of obtaining success in these well meant attempts. **The answer to the communication of the 17th. gave to the special envoy that Peru has accredited in Chile the duty of giving these explanations; but the Peruvian Envoy, asked about the existence of the secret Treaty has found convenient to answer only with a daring denial, declaring that it is unknown to him and that he will ask his Government.** As to the conference alluded to, you know that the undersigned had the regret of knowing

that he would not obtain a declaration of neutrality from the Peruvian Government; that it was united to Bolivia by an alliance pact; that no reason was powerful enough to induce it to break that convention.

«The character of belligerent, assumed deliberately by the Government of Peru with the fact of refusing to make the declaration of neutrality asked, resides in the having given as basis for the refusal the existence of an Alliance concerted with one of the belligerents; in the having delivered direct help in arms and ammunitions; and in the bellicose attitude that assume, after these antecedents, the active preparations that the undersigned referred to in his communication of March 17th. and that continue with unusual activity. This demonstrates that it is not suitable to the dignity of Chile to maintain this Legation which—since its arrival to Peru and during her long permanency—has not been guided by any other purpose than to serve, with complete devotion, the fostering of the fraternal

friendship which should perfectly bind the two peoples.

«The undersigned consequently declares ended his mission of peace, declines all responsibility for this determination on the Government of Peru that has rendered it necessary and begs you to kindly send his passports to leave the country at the earliest opportunity.

«On this occasion has the honour, etc.—
(Signed).—*Joaquín Godoy*».

BOLIVIA AND PERU AFTER THE WAR

When the war finished, Bolivia accepted, with the integrity of all virile nations, the consummated facts and signed with Chile the Truce Pact, to be followed in 1904 by a definite Treaty of Peace and Friendship.

There is a fundamental difference between the attitude of Bolivia and Peru, before and after the war.

If we except the painful interlude of 1879, Bolivia has always been a friend of ours. Chileans and their capitals have continued enjoying in that country all the guarantees that serious and well organized countries grant to the capitals and citizens of other countries.

The intellectual and commercial interchange has continued its development without hindrance. Our educational institutions have always had their doors amply

opened to the studious youth of Bolivia which has come to them without hesitation.

Officers from her army have come to our Aviation School and have graduated there. Chilean professionals have also been engaged to serve in that country and it has not been unusual to see Bolivian citizens serve in Chile as paid public employees.

In a word, it can be said that both peoples have cordially grasped hands. Bolivia had the misfortune to be governed by men like Melgarejo, Morales, Belzu and Daza, for whom there was no internal laws or International Law and to this circumstance we must attribute a great part of the errors of her international policy at the time.

Saving honourable exceptions like Ballivian, Frias and Linares, the men that took power in Bolivia were the production of revolutions or barrack mutinies. With serious Governments like those that have directed the destinies of Bolivia since 1879, that unfortunate hiatus in our diplomatic relations could have been avoided.

To the material progress manifested in the country after the war, we must add

the political progress, which is not less remarkable and which places Bolivia among the well governed nations of South America.

It is natural then, to see that in Chile there is a sincere sentiment of friendship and sympathy towards Bolivia; sentiment that has had official demonstration in treaties like those of 1895 and 1904, which although the first was not perfected, it gave evidence of the reciprocal aspirations of approachal of both countries and opened the road to the Treaty of 1904.

We consider opportune to record here the opinions given on this, by two prominent public men of Bolivia—ex-President Montes and Sr. Alberto Gutiérrez, present Minister of Foreign Affairs—opinions that make more remarkable the contrast with the international policy of Peru and the mentality of her directing men, in front of the attitude taken by Bolivia in the question of the Pacific.

Sr. Montes in the platform on which he accepted the candidacy to the Presidency of the Republic in 1903, says:

«There are necessary sacrifices, when with them there is hope of obtaining salutary

reactions that will place us in the road of an ampler and quiet development. The statu-quo, as point of international policy, would be efficacious only if we had founded expectations of placing ourselves in the near future at the level of neighbouring more advanced nations, to enforce a solution of pending questions without ceding in the least any of our rights. But if such probability is less sure with the passing of time and in consequence of the protraction itself of a solution, we are forced to agree in the necessity of provoking such solutions by means of equitable agreements».

And on taking the oath as President he declared:

«I think that we must invite to act in equal form Chile and Paraguay, equally friendly peoples, with which we have old divergencies to settle: or immediate direct settlement or arbitration, as Bolivia is not lacking in courage to accept the emergencies of her misfortune in the war of the Pacific and **has enough integrity** to work out her future even among her anguish; and since she **has clear notion of her situation she knows what it is**

possible to expect, as she knows that **it is necessary to cede**, she only needs to protect her sovereignty withing invariable lines and for this **it is indispensable to reach a final solution**. The Government inaugurated to day will look for it with patriotic insistence **among equitable conditions that will satisfy the reciprocal conveniences of both peoples**, a thing that also constitutes the legitimate aspiration of both».

On his part Sr. Gutiérrez, referring to the Treaty approved in 1904 says:

«**Bolivia could not remain at standstill in a redoubt, claiming to heaven with sterile increpations and sacrificing the welfare and future of the Republic. Her duty was to take account of the clear notion of facts before lending ear to the impulses of an irresponsible sentimentalism. In this epoch of practical initiatives and positive progress, the dreams and vagaries of former ages have no place. This does not mean to unrecognize the notion of the honour and dignity of nations but to place this principle on the ground of**

its true significance. The honour of a country consists in the virile defense of her rights but not in the sacrifice of the national future by a barren and insensate obstinacy.

«It is clear as the sun's light that the Treaty with Chile has strengthened our international prestige and has approached us to a country with which we engage a pledge of a practical and lasting solidarity.

«To the Government of Bolivia corresponds the satisfaction of having contemplated all the necessities, all the guarantees and all the practical possibilities within the boundary of facts, without going into the cloudy region of dreams, declamations and vain and useless utopia».

This language that characterizes a people, has never been used by Peruvian politicians, who have preferred to falsely pander to the national pride, deluding and exploiting it.

The phrases we have quoted constitute and admirable lesson of practical sense and more than that, of patriotic and honest

policy, that some day may be useful to the politicians of Lima.

Bolivia and Chile are the two countries called to understand each other in the international life.

Peru on the contrary goes on cultivating her centurial ill-will; sacrifices national convenience to the hate against Chile and hermetically closing herself against all reasonable adjustment, prefers to remain isolated in her diplomatic relations with our country. Her Government makes use of the international question with Chile on each occasion in which the internal situation is menacing and in the present has had no scruples in retiring her consular representation in Chile, at the moment in which ceased in Europe the horrors of a war lasting over four years, with the evident purpose of making believe that in America a new war was to be started and that Chile was provoking it!!!

Mediation would have been the result and at the worst, the Peace Conference would have had to discuss the question of Tacna and Arica and there would have been no further need of thinking about

the Ancón Treaty, which to them is now «a rag of paper».

But all this comedy, prepared from long date by Peru, will not have the expected success, because even from a well arranged comedy the result will never be an honourable international settlement.

CURIOUS PERUVIAN CHARACTERISTIC

Before ending we will call the attention of the reader to a fact that is characteristic of the Peruvian psychology: the acute tendency, incorrigible in that nation, of always trying to get help and accomplices for her international plots.

This tendency can be observed since Peru was born to independent life. In 1828 she solicited with eagerness, although without success, the help of Chile to make war on Colombia; in 1840 she asked the same alliance to invade Bolivia and in 1864 to attack Ecuador, failing in both attempts and being dissuaded by Chile of such enterprises.

Lastly in 1873 she asked the alliance of Bolivia and Argentine to attack Chile, obtaining only the help of Bolivia.

Results—fortunately for the American continent—have been always adverse to her, but without being enough to correct the tendency. The war against Colombia ended in a complete defeat of the Peruvian army; the war against Bolivia in 1841 resulted in an irreparable disaster, notwithstanding the securities she had by her superiority in arms and men; and as refers to the war with Chile the results were not more favourable.

And the same in peace as in war, in her desire of always asking foreign help, on knowing the triumph of the Allies, she has quickly gone to knock at their doors extending the hand asking for alms, in the attitude of the ruined gambler asking for a guerdon from the ones that are fortunate.

The Treaty of Ancon is for Peru to-day a rag of paper and the victors of the Great War must be greatly satisfied, according to the Peruvian mentality, if as a result of their victories they free her of the consequences of her outrages against americanism.

THE NITRATE, THE PERUVIAN MONOPOLY AND THE SECRET TREATY

SUMMARY.—*History. The nitrate policy of Peru: the law of monopoly and the Secret Treaty. The nitrate policy of Chile: free industry and guarantees to property.—Enormous development of the industry.*

Before considering the nitrate policy of Peru and the influence it had in her international policy it is of some interest for the reader to know, briefly, the history of nitrate, dating from the first years of the XIX century.

A German citizen, Taddeus Haenke, residing in Bolivia, discovered in 1809 a

process to extract nitrate from the imbedded salts of Tarapacá (1)

During the first years and with the rude processes of the time, the annual production did not pass 900 metric tons and its use as a fertilizer was unknown. About 1830 it was applied in Europe as fertilizer and a few years later, in 1856, a marked progress was obtained by the application of steam to the treatment of crude nitrate. This innovation gave great impulse to the nitrate industry, and towards 1873 production reached 200 000 tons. A considerable part of this production corresponded to Chilean capitals, as we will see further on.

Peru notwithstanding the enormous revenues obtained from the guano was rapidly nearing bankruptcy, in consequence of the immoderate expenditure of public funds and the unscrupulous conduct of her governing men.

The fiscal situation was made more serious every moment, as nitrate had begun

(1) Semper & Michelis.—*The industry of nitrate in Chile*. (Berlin 1904) translated by Gandarillas and Ghigliotto.

to make a successful competition to the guano, whose prices and quality were falling in the European markets, and with this all the economical and financial system of Peru was shaken.

But the Peruvian Government had in its hands both fertilizers: the first in its almost totality and the second in a 75 per cent.

To maintain the price of guano the Government decided to restrict the export of nitrate and with this object enacted on the *18th. January of 1873 the Monopoly Law* prohibiting the export of nitrate not bought by the State and authorizing the Government to buy it from private producers at a fixed price of 44d, the 46 kilos of 95% purity. The quantity to be bought during the first year was fixed in 200 000 tons.

In this manner the Peruvian Government was in position of regulating at will the export of nitrate and of maintaining the price of guano that was the main source of her revenue.

But the fact that there was also nitrate in the Bolivian littoral and in the Atacama desert, that Bolivia disputed in part to Chile,

made insecure the success of the monopoly and caused justified anxiety to the rulers of Peru.

If, as maintained by Chile, her authority reached to the 23 parallel, a considerable part of the nitrate zone of Antofagasta remained in Chilean territory.

The *modus-vivendi* adjusted by the treaty of 1866 was unsatisfactory to Bolivia and Chile and both were trying to make a new agreement.

Under these conditions and with eyes fixed on the nitrate zone that was outside the influence of her monopoly, the peruvian Government secretly reached an understanding with Bolivia and on the 6th February 1873, that is to say a few days after the passing of the monopoly law, a secret Treaty was signed between both Governments.

The Monopoly Law whose double aim was to create a revenue for the State and to make effective the monopoly, did not have the results expected and was replaced by a Law of Expropriation of nitrate fields, enacted the 28th. May 1875.

The provisions of the law are the following:

1st.: The laws of 18th. January and 23rd. April 1873 creating the Monopoly of nitrate and the Executive decrees for their execution are annulled.

«2nd.: The sale of nitrate fields is prohibited.

«3rd.: The Executive is empowered to purchase the fields and plants manufacturing nitrate in the Tarapacá province, adopting for this the legal measures considered necessary. The Executive is also empowered to adjust contracts for the exploitation and sales of nitrate.

4th.: The Executive will contract with guarantee of the properties bought and the rest of the nitrate fields belonging to the State in the province of Tarapacá, a loan not exceeding £ 7 000 000, to make effective the provisions of this law and up to £ 3 000 000 to finish the railroads under construction and other general necessities of the State.—*Manuel Pardo.*—*Juan Ignacio Elgueta.*»

By a decree dated April 29th the Executive delivered to the banks «National of

Peru», «Peru», «Lima» and «Providence» the administration of the monopoly of nitrate and established that the contracts for nitrate output would be limited to 100 000 tons per year.

The execution of the law gave rise to outrageous frauds as well in the valuation of the nitrate establishments as in the expedition of the «certificates» covering their value, because valuation was not only exorbitant for certain proprietors who enjoyed in Lima the favour of the Government, but also establishments were sold that only existed in the documents prepared for this effect, that the public called «pamphlets», whose «certificates» were fraudulent as they corresponded to imaginary establishments.

As consequence of such frauds, the Government of Chile saw itself involved later on in serious difficulties for the payment of such «certificates» because there were diplomatic reclamations from the Governments of Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy, which unknowing the antecedents, protected their respective citizens possessors of such «certificates». But when

the Chilean Government showed the true origin of such documents the Governments of Great Britain and Germany dropped their reclamations.

Yet, this law of expoliation that raised indignant protests even in Peru, was of baleful results for the nitrate industry.

The output of nitrate that had passed from 180 000 tons in 1870 to 335 000 tons in 1875, year of the enacting of the law, fell to 275 000 tons in 1878.

The owners received in exchange of their properties «nitrate certificates» that the Government of Peru never paid.

«Such was the realization of the Peruvian monopoly of nitrate—says the distinguished jurist Sr. Carlos Aldunate Solar in a remarkable study on the constitution of nitrate property—brilliant operation under the fiscal point of view, because the treasury did not spend a single cent, but iniquitous under the point of view of right, because it was the most daring expoliation to be conceived against private property».

To avoid the competition of the Antofagasta nitrate, that was free of the mono-

poly, the Government of Peru sent to Bolivia Mr. John G. Meiggs who obtained by deed of 20th. March of 1876 the lease «for a term of 20 years and by payment of a rent of 10 000 bolivians a month, of all the nitrate fields not ceded until that date or those to be recovered later».

At the same time Mr. Meiggs adjusted with private owners the purchase of 63 parcels of nitrate deposits at the rate of 8 000 pesos per parcel. This was the necessary complement of the monopoly law, but there remained always very important establishments unaffected by the agreement.

The ex-President of Peru Sr. Billinghurst in a study on the nitrate question, says:

«Those that combated that **peculation funest for Peru**, cried then uselessly on the near and alarming competition of the Chilean nitrate zone. Such patriotic advises were unheard for some years, until there was no remedy for the error».

As a consequence of the monopoly the price of nitrate was raised in the European markets up to 15½ shillings but the consumption suffered an equivalent reduction.

The capitals invested in Tarapaca, were distributed in 1878 as follows (1)

	Production capacity in tons.
Peruvian capitals.....	442 000
Chilean capitals (2).....	140 000
English capitals.....	100 000
German capitals.....	58 000
Italian capitals.....	10 000

As we see the Chilean interests affected by the monopoly were considerable and in view of the odious expoliation of which they were the victims, the Chilean industrials came back to their country to explore and discover new beds of nitrate in the desert of Atacama.

The Government of Chile lent them all possible support and on the 28th. July 1877 approved a liberal Regulation for

(1) G. Billingham, *The nitrate capitals of Tarapacá, 1889.*

(2) Sr. Billingham places under this head the production that was wholly chilean, but *there were several concerns with mixed capitals and it must be observed also that the exodus of chilean capitals had begun five years before, in 1873, at the passing of the monopoly law.*

nitrate concessions declaring this substance free of export duties.

This was the situation when in 1879 came the conflict with Bolivia that produced the war.

When the united armies of Peru and Bolivia were routed, and Tarapacá was occupied by the Chilean forces, Chile was confronted by the problem of the nitrate property and of the monopoly.

«There were two roads: the fiscal monopoly or the free industry, taxed with export duties. Chile preferred the last, as less conducive to the difficulties of an administration by the State and because it gave opportunity to satisfy private interests engaged in the nitrate industry.

*«In 1882, Chile had the satisfaction of announcing to the whole world that she respected private property in Tarapaca **and even the property of the enemies that was confiscated in their own country.** The properties purchased by the Peruvian Government were returned, within a certain term, to the owners of the «certificates» who were considered as creditors of an unpaid debt. The establishments recognized by Peru*

as private property and that were not sold as yet were simply delivered to their owners.

«When the term for the restitution of the property against the certificates expired, the Government of Chile adjusted in 1887 a treaty with several foreign powers, by which the payment of «pending certificates» was guaranteed at the rate of £ 105 for each thousand soles of face value. Some holders of «certificates» that thought they had a right to take protection under the decree of 1882 did not accept the price of £ 105 and asked the devolution of their property. This question was settled in favour of the nitrate industrials by a law enacted in 1892» (1).

This was the nitrate policy of the Chilean Government and under its protection abundant capitals were invested, specially english, because there was a nitrate fever in the London Bourse. From 13% the english capital passed to represent the 34% and

(1) C. Aldunate Solar: *Constitution of the nitrate property.*

then the 55% of the total capital invested in this industry in Tarapacá.

The nitrate policy of Chile has been of use to the general interest of all peoples that need this fertilizer, establishing the system of free production and delivering to private enterprise the exploitation of the nitrate fields.

The results of such policy were almost immediate, as we can see by the following diagram of production: (1)

1885.....	..	475 000 tons.
1890.....	.	1 060 000 »
1895....	1 342 000 »
1900.....	1 580 000 »
1905.....	1 795 000 »
1908.....	2 142 000 »
1913.....	3 013 000 »
1918.....	3 108 000 »

Resuming we have that to the Peruvian policy of monopolies and expropriation that tended to the artificial raise of the price, reducing the output so as not to depreciate

(1) *Statistical returns, 1918.*

the guano, the Government of Chile opposed a policy of ample liberty for the industry, of scrupulous respect for private property without distinction between nationals or foreigners, and not even of enemies.

The property of enemies was sacred for the Chilean Government and although it had been expropriated by the Peruvian Government and could be considered with perfect right as the property of this, it was returned to the legitimate owners who found in such manner under an enemical and triumphant Government the justice and guarantees denied by their own.

PERU AND HER REVOLUTION

There is no human memory capable of retaining the numberless revolutions, mutinies, «pronunciamientos» and riots that have followed each other in Peru since she became independent.

The revolutionary spirit is so imbedded in their men that for the Peruvian mentality it as come to be a natural sequence the Presidency, the Panoptic (Jail) and banishment, following each other as almost inseparable steps in the public career of her governing men.

So that no doubt can be had as to the veracity and exactness of this chronology, we take the data from authentic Peruvian sources like the «*History of Independent Peru*» by Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán (Lima 1870) and the History by M. Nemesio Vargas (Lima 1903).

In this way the reader will not think imagined by the author what in reality is only the stupendous life of a people victim of revolutionary atavism.

We will attempt a brief review of the Peruvian Governments and the revolutions that raised them to power, as most of her Presidents have obtained power by those means.

1.—In 1823 was organized in Lima de first Government Junta.

The spanish royalist forces commanded by La Serna continued their obstinate resistance. This was no obstacle for the Peruvian army mutining, marching on Lima and dissolving the Junta.

2.—Colonel José de la Riva Agüero was proclaimed President of the Republic, but few months after was deposed and his resistance gave start to a prolonged civil war. As he could not dominate it he tried to join sides with the royalists; his treason was discovered by colonel La Fuente, who arrested and banished him.

To be able to appreciate the civic virtues and soul of the first President of

Peru, let us see the letters appended to this page, in which the illustrious general San Martín, one of the Founders of American Independence pens the moral portrait of Riva Agüero (1)

(1) RIVA AGÜERO TO SAN MARTÍN: (1)

Tupiza, August 22nd. 1823.

To H. E. Sr. don José de San Martín.

My most dear friend and Sir: To what I said to you the 3rd of this month, I add that the time has come for your fulfilling the offer of lending your services. The situation of Peru is advantageous and imposing; she has never had a quarter of the forces she now has. The political horizon is very favourable: *the Departments and the troops are decidedly with me, that is to say against the blackest of intrigues. This must be revealed everywhere so that the intriguers are known and precautions taken against their traps.*

All the arms you can bring from Mendoza, Cordoba and elsewhere, please send where I may be; under the agreement that their value will be paid and that you will lend a notable service to Peru.

If within three days the Liberator has not come from Colombia, who is announced as coming by Paita to here, I will go out to place myself at the head of the army which is at Huaraz. This army is well prepared; is commanded by Herrera and by its discipline and numbers *I count to enter in Lima the day I wish.*

I leave to your consideration to think over the situation and the interest of your coming to the Headquarters of this army of the north. That of the south commanded by general

(1) This letters are taken from the book: *San Martín. His correspondence. 1823-1850.* Madrid (1910) Bailly Bailliere & Sons. They are also cited in the *History of San Martín* by Bartolomé Mitre, page 696, vol. III. Buenos Aires, (1888).

3.—Torre Tagle takes the power and following the example of his predecessor he plays traitor to his country and delivers himself to the royalists. The Peruvian historian Paz Soldán refers to him as follows:

Santa Cruz, and the Navy, are faithful; we have nothing to do but the attempt, to succeed. I include papers from Panamá and here; and beg that you push the action of Urdininea on Potosi and Oruro.

Wishing you the best of healths and to embrace you, your passionate friend and server.

JOSE DE LA RIVA AÜERO.

ANSWER TO THE FORMER.

Mendoza, October 23rd. 1823.

Sr. don José de la Riva Agüero.

Two days ago I have received from Chile by special courier yours of the 22nd August, dated in Trujillo, including public papers of the same district to the 25th; in it you invite me without loss of time to start to joint you; assuring me that the time has come to fulfill my offer of serving Peru; adding that the political horizon is very favourable, that the Departments and troops are with you against the blackest intrigue, which must be made known everywhere so that the intriguers are known and precautions taken against them.

On writing to me in such manner you doubtless forgot that you were writing to a General who has the title of Founder of the Liberty of the country that you, yes! You have made unfortunate. If I offered my services to the Governing Junta and you, under the precise condition of being under the orders of another General, it was as a consequence of fulfilling the promise made to Peru at my parting, if she was in danger, as I believed after the misfortune of Moquegua. But how can you believe

«With rudimentary instruction; morally and physically feeble to the extent of being a coward, he was traitor by cowardice more than by wickedness. His public life was a succession of treacheries. If we be-

that the offers of General San Martín—to which you *dit not deign to reply*—could ever have been made to a private person and far less to your despicable person? I fail to understand your daring coarseness in making the proposal of using my arms in a civil conflict!

Malefactor! Do you know if my weapons have ever been tainted with American blood? And you invite me to do it, at the same time that the Gazette you include of the 24th August proscribes the Congress declaring it traitor to his country... the Congress you suppose to have had great influence in forming; yes, you had the greater part, but it was thanks to base intrigue that you prepared for the election of deputies and to continue discrediting, by means of the press and your despicable followers, the allied armies and a general from which you have received only favours and who will always feel responsible to Peru for not having blotted out a malefactor burdened with crimes like you.

You say that you are going to take command of the army at Huaraz; is there a single officer capable of serving against his country and especially at the orders of a scoundrel like you?

Impossible! I am writing to colonel Urdininea, but it is making a true portrait of your black soul... Let us end, a backward should not be able to call the attention of a honest man.

JOSÉ DE SAN MARTÍN.

NOTE.—Sr. de la Riva Agüero to whom this letter is addressed, is the first President of Peru, the father of the Foreign Minister who signed the Secret Treaty with Bolivia.

lieve what he himself says, we could say that in all the posts he filled during the Colonial regime he betrayed the confidence deposited in him; this is proved by the relation he makes of his services to the American cause...

«By one of the human weaknessess that have no explanation, Torre Tagle at the same time that he gave instructions to the Minister of War, general Berindoaga and in a private letter manifested his great interest for the independence of Peru and that he would act in accord with Bolivia, had initiated in secret, a month before, direct negotiations with the royalist commander Canterac to adjust a treaty on the basis that Bolivar was expelled from Peru».

And further on he adds:

«The treason of Torre Tagle was consummated and the President of the Republic delivered himself voluntarily into the hands of the enemies of the country, fearing to pay his crimes on the gibbet, where at least he would have had the compassion of some; but this scoundrel that a few days before ordered the execution of Riva

Agüero, secretly and in the dark of night only because he was a supposed traitor to the country, **not only sided with the Spaniards but delivered to them all the secrets and plans of operations.**

And so that never could be any doubt that his treason was complete and of his own free will, addressed to the Peruvians a manifesto saying: *I have wished that you made the union with the spaniards* as the only means of avoiding ruin... Bolivar privately prayed me to open negotiations with the Spaniards, to give time to reinforce himself and destroy them, involving the Peruvians in his ruin; but *I took profit of this* for obtaining our union with advantage... Of the frank and sincere union of Peruvian and Spaniards everything good is to be expected: from Bolivar only desolation and death.»

4, 5.—Torre Tagle was deposed and the dictatorship of Bolivar came, but a reaction headed by marshal Santa Cruz placed La Mar in the Presidency in 1829.

6.—General Gamarra deposes La Mar and La Fuente goes into power.

7.—Gamarra pulls down La Fuente and

enforces his election as provisory President.

In six years there have been six different Governments, fruit of as many revolutions; and in the same year of 1829 La Mar, La Fuente and Gamarra occupy the Presidency.

Two revolutions break out, headed by Salaverry and Escobedo but they do not succeed in routing Gamarra who keeps in power until 1833.

8.—Gamarra is replaced by Orbegoso.

9, 10.—Gamarra starts a revolution against Orbegoso and places Bermúdez in power, but a new revolution restores the power to Orbegoso.

11.—Salaverry heads a revolution against Orbegoso and takes Lima; but Orbegoso and Gamarra join Santa Cruz, President of Bolivia, who was invading Peru at the time. Salaverry is taken prisoner and shot.

12.—Santa Cruz is routed by the Chilean forces that came to help Peru; Orbegoso and Gamarra renied of the Protector (Santa Cruz) and Gamarra takes the power in 1840.

Vivanco heads a revolution against Gamarra and is routed; but soon after Gamarra

is killed in the battle of Ingaví and two simultaneous revolutions are started, one by Vidal in Cuzco and the other by Torrico in Lima.

13, 14, 15.—Vidal triumphs and is made President; before the year is out he is deposed by Vivanco who in his turn is deposed by Menéndez.

16, 17, 18.—Menéndez is replaced by the governments of Castilla and Echenique, but Castilla rebels against Echenique and proclaims himself dictator of Peru.

19, 20, 21.—Follow San Román and Pezet, but this one is deposed by don Mariano Ignacio Prado who starts a revolution in Arequipa and takes the government.

22.—Balta revolts against Prado and takes the Presidency but before finishing his term is murdered in the revolution of the Gutiérrez brothers.

The revolution is dominated and the brothers are hung and burnt in the public square.

23.—Prado goes into power and Pierola tries three revolutions against him. Prado is murdered soon after leaving power, at

the moment of entering the Senate to take its chairmanship.

24, 25.—Prado succeeds Pardo, but less fortunate is deposed by Pierola, when the war of the Pacific is in full vigour.

26, 27.—Then come the «pronunciamientos» of Lizardo Montero, Alejandrino del Solar and Andrés Avelino Cáceres and the coups of Iglesias and García Calderón who hold power for a short time.

28, 29.—Cáceres takes the presidency in 1884. Mutinies and sedition follow one after another but do not succeed. Cáceres is replaced by Morales Bermúdez who dies soon before ending his term.

30.—Cáceres attempts to eliminate the first Vice-President and to obtain an election in his favour. As soon as he is in power a revolution starts that lasted until March 1895, headed by Piérola. Cáceres is banished.

31.—Piérola takes the Presidency and governs from 1895 to 1899. During this time occur the rebellions of Durand, Yessup and Vizcarra without success.

32.—Piérola is succeeded by Sr. Eduardo López Romaña—1899 to 1903—Durand and Vizcarra again rebel but are routed.

33.—From 1903 to 1904 governs Sr. Manuel Candamo who dies in power and is replaced by Sr. José Pardo. New rebellion of Durand in Chosica, dominated again.

34.—Sr. Augusto B. Leguía assumes the Presidency in 1908 and on May 26th. 1909 a group of rebels headed by the three sons of Pierola suddenly attack the Government Palace, kill the chief of the guard and the Aide de Camp that tried to protect the President, take by force the President with them and after outraging and insulting him, take him by force to the statue of Bolivar where they demand the resignation of his charge. During the discussion some faithful troops were assembled and came to the rescue and after a few platoon discharges against the rebels extracted the President, unhurt, from among the bodies of the rebels killed round him.

When his term expired, on leaving the Government Palace, Sr. Leguía was object of hostile demonstrations of the people who followed him to his house insulting him and throwing whatever came to hand. Soon after his house was assaulted and

he defended himself with his servants. He was arrested, sent to the Panóptico, (central jail) and banished.

35.—Leguía is replaced by Sr. Guillermo Billinghurst—9th September 1912—but in February 1914 this eminent public man is deposed by a military mutiny headed by colonel Benavides, an officer trained in France, who had gained great reputation by an expedition to the Caquetá (Amazonian region) where «with 500 men and gun boats he attacked 70 sick colombian soldiers who formed the forces of the Custom of La Pedrera and vanquished them after a three days fight» (1).

Billinghurst went to the Panóptico like Leguía and like him was banished from the country.

36.—Benavides occupies the Presidency and the mutinies of Durand, in La Paz and Yerbateros and of Colónel Riveros in Ancash, take place and are dominated.

37.—Benavides is succeeded by President Pardo. There is a revolutionary movement in Ancon, headed by major Patiño

(1) Juan Ignacio Galvez, *International Conflicts*. Santiago,

Zamudio, dominated by the Government.

The presidential elections take place and soon after, Sr. Leguía surprises the Government Palace with troops siding with him, imprisons Pardo and banished him and his followers, on the 4th July 1919.

Resuming we have that of the Presidents of Peru, only 10 finished their term, triumphing against the revolutions; 19 were pulled down and 3 were murdered.

In Chile since 1831, President José Joaquín Prieto being elected, all the Presidents without exception, during near a century of independent life, have succeeded each other within the Constitution and only one did not end his term of office, President Balmaceda, one of the most illustrious Presidents of America, who considered that before anything he should enforce respect to the principle of authority. He was vanquished by the forces of Congress which maintained the implantation of the parliamentary system of government, but he preferred to kill himself rather than escape because in his own words «the vulgar evasion did not accord with the pride of Chilean and gentleman nor with the dignity

of the President who had directed the destinies of Chile».

President Balmaceda shot himself the 18th September 1891, day in which his term of office expired.

His history is clean of any blot of treason or cowardice and never a President of Chile has fallen under the hand of a murderer.

THE END

INDEX

	Page
The Chilean Peruvian friendship and its diplomatic history.....	7
The Liberating Expedition.....	9
Peru asks from Chile further help in men and funds (1823).....	11
The Government of Chile grants all the Peruvian petitions (1823).....	15
Peru asks the alliance of Chile to declare war on Colombia (1828).....	20
The mediation of Chile avoids a war between Peru and Bolivia (1831).....	23
Peru starts a policy of open commercial hostility (1832)	26
Tariff war (1832).....	29
Chile and Peru near rupture (1834).....	33
Rengifo-Tabara Treaty abrogated by Peru six months after proclamation (1834).....	35
Invasion of Peru by marshal Santa Cruz.—Chile goes to the help of Peru (1837-1839).....	38
Peru asks the alliance of Chile against Bolivia (1840)...	47
Chile interposes her good offices to avoid a war between Peru and Bolivia (1840).....	50
Peru apparently settles her questions with Bolivia (1840)	53
Peru invades Bolivia and is routed at Ingavi (1841)....	56
The Peruvians discover that Chilean flour causes dysentery.....	61

	Page
Reagravation in Peru of outrages and vexations towards Chileans (1841).....	64
Absurd rumours on secret purposes of Chile (1842)	70
Chile negotiates for the payment of the old Peruvian debt.....	73
Policy of protraction of the Peruvian Government (1847).....	76
Friendly interlude (1852).....	79
The war with Spain (1864).....	83
Great demonstrations in Peru of gratitude to Chile..	100
Peru asks the help of Chile (1864)	107
Double game of the Peruvian Government and fortunate speculations (1864).....	109
Public powers of Peru more interested in internal poli- tics than in the war.....	111
Attacks to Chile: she is accused of treason and of com- plicity with Spain (1864).....	115
Ample satisfactions given to the Chilean representative	117
The Congress of Plenipotentiaries. The Chilean repre- sentative. Sr. Manuel Montt takes a prominent position (1864).....	119
Communication of Sr. Manuel Montt on his instructions	123
Peru wishes to make war on Ecuador.....	130
Results.....	131
The Secret Treaty and the attitude of Argentine (1873)	132
The clean traditional policy of Argentine.....	138
The war of the Pacific. Its origin and causes.....	145
The limit question between Chile and Bolivia.....	151
Lindsay-Corral. Convention.. ..	161
Treaty of 1874.....	162
Violation of the treaty of 1874.....	165
Proposals of arbitration.....	170
The properties of the Chilean Nitrate Company are confiscated.....	173
Occupation of Antofagasta.....	178

	Page
The mediation of Peru (1879).....	181
The Lavalle mission.....	190
Interview of Lavalle with President Pinto.....	193
President Pardo acknowledges the existence of the Secret Treaty.....	206
Bolivia and Peru after the war.....	216
Curious Peruvian characteristic.....	224
The nitrate, the Peruvian monopoly and the Secret Treaty.....	226
Peru and her revolutions....	239



— ESTADO 63 —

